Hunt v. Superior Court of Los Angeles
Before: Angellotti
Synopsis
APPLICATION for Writ of Prohibition directed to the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, and Curtis D. Wilbur, Judge thereof.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
ANGELLOTTI, C. J.
By this proceeding a writ of prohibition is sought to restrain the superior court of Los Angeles County from trying petitioner, the treasurer of said county, on a written accusation presented by the grand jury of said county, charging him with willful misconduct in office, as such treasurer. The proceeding against him was instituted under the authorization given by section 758 et seq. of the Penal Code of the state, a general law of the state providing for the accusation and trial in the superior court of public officers for misconduct in office, and a judgment of removal from office in the event of conviction. The proceeding against petitioner was strictly in accord with the provisions of these sections. The claim is that this state law has no application to petitioner by reason of the alleged fact that he is an appointive officer, holding his office under the provisions of the county charter of the county, which provides the sole means and method by which appointive officers may be removed, thereby superseding the Penal Code provisions. If this claim he well based, the superior court is without jurisdiction of the proceeding against petitioner. The attorneys for the respective parties have presented with great ability their respective views as to the validity under our constitution of any county charter provisions purporting to provide an exclusive method by which county officers may be re-moved, and also as to the true meaning of the complex and confusing provisions of the Los Angeles County charter in regard to the matter of the removal of officers and employees. They have ignored certain suggestions of the county counsel
[472]
of Los Angeles County filed by him as
amicus curiae,
which, in view of the allegations of the petition for prohibition, appear to us to be well based and to necessarily lead to the conclusion that the charter provisions relied on have no application to petitioner, and that as to him the general law of the state as to removal from office for misconduct in office is applicable.
The county charter was framed and adopted under the provisions of section 7% of article XI of our constitution, going into force in June, 1913. Up to that time the county had operated under the general laws of the state relative to counties and their government. At that time petitioner was the treasurer of such county, having been regularly elected to the office under such laws, at the general election in November, 1910, for a term of four years commencing on the first Monday of January, 1911, and, according to our statutes and decisions, to hold thereafter until his successor was legally selected and had qualified. By the charter certain offices which were previously elective, including that of treasurer, were made appointive offices, the appointment to be made by the board of supervisors. By provisions contained in the article on civil service, officers elected by the people and certain other positions were placed in what was called the “unclassified service,” which was free from civil service supervision. It was then provided that “the classified service shall include all other positions now existing or hereafter created,” which would include the office of treasurer. As to the classified service the article contains various provisions which it is claimed establish a method of discharge, removal and reduction in rank. Section 37 (in this article) provides: “All persons in the county or township service holding positions in the classified service as established by this article, at the time it takes effect, whether holding by election or by appointment, and who shall have been in such service for the six months next preceding, shall hold their positions until discharged, reduced, promoted or transferred in accordance with the provisions of this article. ...” It is apparently petitioner’s theory that he is holding his office solely under the provisions of this section, and without any other appointment or qualification whatsoever. He simply alleges his election as herein-before stated, his qualification under such election and entering upon his duties in January, 1911, that he continued as
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