Carpenter v. State Bar

PRESTON, J.

Proceeding to review the action of the Board of Governors of The State Bar.

[359]

Petitioner, on December 17, 192'7, at the time the State Bar Act went into effect, was a licensed attorney authorized to practice in the courts of this state. He paid his membership dues as prescribed in said act for a time. However, on November 22, 1929, the Board of Governors increased the annual dues from $5 to $7.50 and at about the same time imposed a penalty for delinquency in this payment of $3.

Petitioner paid neither the • dues nor the penalty for the year 1930. The two months’ notice prescribed by section 46 of the act was regularly given and following the expiration of this period, on June 20, 1930, the Board of Governors took action purporting to suspend petitioner from membership in The State Bar.

The section of the State Bar Act (Stats. 1927, p. 38) involved, so far as here material, is as follows: “Sec. 46. . . . Any member . . . failing to pay any fees . . . and after two months’ written notice of his delinquency, must be suspended from membership in The State Bar. ...” This section is followed by section 47, which reads: “No person shall practice law in this state subsequent to the first meeting of The State Bar unless he shall be an active member thereof as hereinbefore defined.”

It is clear, therefore, that the sum total or aggregate effect of these provisions is to suspend the right of petitioner to practice law, which suspension will terminate only upon his compliance with the law. It is to be noted, however, that the act does not in so many words say that the Board of Governors shall make the order of suspension from membership. It occurs to us that as this really amounts to suspension from the right to practice law and further that inasmuch as an attorney is an officer of the court, it would seem to have been the legislative intent that his suspension should be made by an order of this court and that the action of the Board of Governors in the matter should be treated as a finding of‘fact and recommendation that this court make such order. This too is in consonance with our holdings in matters of admission and discipline of attorneys.

(In re Shattuck,