Kreling v. McMullen (1910) · DecisionDepot

Kreling v. McMullen

Name: California Superior Court Tentative Rulings
Creator: DecisionDepot
License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/

California Supreme Court Sep 30, 1910 No. S.F. No. 5122.Published

Before: Melvin

AI Brief

AI-generated · verify before citing

Holding. The court held that in an appeal from a default judgment, it must be presumed that the plaintiffs were the holders of the principal obligation, thereby authorizing them to foreclose on the chattel mortgage.

Issues

Whether a pledgee of a note and mortgage given as collateral security may foreclose on the mortgage without first suing on the principal obligation.
Whether the court must presume the plaintiffs were the holders of the principal obligation in the absence of contrary allegations in a default judgment case.

Disposition. Affirmed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“it was the right of the holder of the principal obligation to foreclose the pledge and this he could do without action upon the principal obligation.”

“under the principle of law which will support such judgments by all reasonable intendments it will be presumed, if necessary, that it was brought by the holder of the principal obligation.”

Synopsis

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

MELVIN, J.

The complaint alleged the making of a promissory note to the firm of Smith

Stevens payable in monthly installments, that the note was secured by a chattel mortgage upon certain property consisting of furniture, carpets, pictures, and other household effects, that the firm of Smith & Stevens duly sold and assigned the said note with the said

[434]

mortgage to plaintiffs and that plaintiffs thereupon became and ever since have been the owners and holders thereof. A copy of the mortgage is attached to the complaint and made a part of it. A breach of the contract entitling plaintiffs to foreclose is alleged and the prayer is for foreclosure under the terms of the mortgage. The mortgagor Victor McMullen defaulted. She now appeals from the judgment, contending that the complaint establishes that the note and mortgage were given as collateral security for the performance of all the terms aud conditions of a certain indenture of lease made between Smith & Stevens, lessors, and herself, lessee, that the pledgee cannot sell any evidence of debt of this kind so pledged to him and that his only recourse in law is to collect it when due (Civ. Code, sec. 3006), that the complaint here establishes an attempt upon the part of the pledgee to do this forbidden thing, that it also establishes the asserted fact that the note and mortgage were given in pledge as collateral security, that the plaintiffs were not the owners or holders of the principal obligation, and that, finally, these purchasers cannot be regarded as innocent, since the mortgage which they took for the promissory note iipon its face discloses that it was given as collateral security for another independent principal obligation.

The propositions of law which appellant thus enunciates are unquestionably sound but they cannot avail her in view of the fact that this is an appeal from the judgment after default and that it is the duty of the court under such circumstances to indulge in all reasonable presumptions and intendments in favor of the judgment. The cases upon this are so numerous and so uniform that it should be sufficient to cite

Caruthers

Kreling v. McMullen

AI Brief

Synopsis

MELVIN, J.

More from California Supreme Court

Related research

AI Brief