Matter of Application of Stork

HENSHAW, J.

Petitioner, a chauffeur who refused to pay the annual license fee of two dollars exacted by the provisions of the Motor Vehicle Act (Stats. 1913, p. 639), suffered arrest and has sued out this writ of

habeas corpus

under his contention that the portion of the act exacting a chauffeur license fee of two dollars annually is unconstitutional.

His sole contention in this regard is that the legislature without reason and warrant has made an arbitrary classification whereby chauffeurs or drivers of motor vehicles for hire are required to pay -a license, while all other drivers of vehicles are classed as “operators” and are not required to secure a license or pay a license fee.

Conceding his construction of the law in this respect to be sound, is the division by the legislature of drivers of motor vehicles into the two classes indicated and the exaction of a license fee from the one and not from the other class so unwarranted and arbitrary as to compel a declaration from this court that it is unconstitutional special legislation?

That the occupation of a chauffeur is one calling for regulation and therefore permitting a regulatory license fee is beyond question. “When the calling or profession or business is attended with danger or requires a certain degree of scientific knowledge upon which others must rely, then legislation properly steps in and imposes conditions upon its exercise.”

(Minneapolis etc. Railroad Co.

v.

Beckwith,

129 U. S. 29, [32 L. Ed. 585, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 207].) That the occupation of a chauffeur is of this character may not be questioned and has been decided.

(State

v.

Swagerty,

203 Mo. 517, [120 Am. St. Rep. 671, 11 Ann. Cas. 725, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 601, 102 S. W. 483];

Christy

v.

Elliott,

216 Ill. 31, [108 Am. St.

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