Pickwick Stages v. Board of Trustees

SHAW, C. J.

The plaintiff appeals from a- judgment entered against it in favor of the defendant J. E. Price on October 5, 1920, for damages in the sum of $3,500. It is based upon a pleading of said J. E. Price denominated a cross-complaint.

The plaintiff’s complaint stated a cause of action in equity showing that the plaintiff was operating a public stage line between Los Angeles and San Francisco in this state, through the cities of El Paso de Robles and San Luis Obispo, under the franchises from the railroad commission and said cities, authorizing it to do so for the period of five years; that the defendants were maliciously conspiring together to deprive plaintiff of said franchises through the city of El Paso de Robles, and threaten to do so and thereby prevent and interfere with the operation of its stages, and made their intent to do so public, thereby preventing passengers from traveling on plaintiff’s stages, to its damage in the sum of $5,000. The complaint prayed for an injunction and for $5,000 as damages.

To this complaint defendant Price filed an answer denominated as an answer and cross-complaint. The so-called cross-complaint, however, merely -states a cause of action in favor of Price against plaintiff for damages. It alleges that Price was operating a stage line from San Luis Obispo to El Paso de Robles for local business and had a franchise and permit from the railroad commission, duly issued, authorizing it to do so; that the plaintiff was operating a through line of stages from Los Angeles to San Francisco, and contrived to intercept local business between its stations in the two cities of San Luis Obispo and El Paso de Robles, which would otherwise have been transacted by Price, to his damage in the sum of $3,500. It asked judgment for this sum and also for exemplary damages in the sum of $5,000.

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The plaintiff failed to file any answer to this so-called cross-complaint. Thereupon, on motion of Price, the court made an order declaring the plaintiff’s default for failure to answer or otherwise plead to the said cross-complaint. The plaintiff soon afterwards moved to set aside the order of default on the ground, first, that the court had not jurisdiction to make such order, and, second, that the failure to answer was due to the inadvertence and excusable neglect of the plaintiff. This motion was denied by the court. Thereafter the cause was set for trial on Hay 18, 1920. Upon the trial, both parties being present, the court refused the demand of the plaintiff that the defendant be required to prove the allegations of the cross-complaint in relation to the damages alleged. It held that the default admitted all of the allegations of the cross-complaint, so called, including the amount of actual damages alleged, and entered judgment in favor of the defendant Price against the plaintiff for $3,500.