Leadbettor v. Indus. Accident Comm'n (1918) · DecisionDepot

Leadbettor v. Indus. Accident Comm'n

Name: California Superior Court Tentative Rulings
Creator: DecisionDepot
License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/

California Supreme Court Dec 30, 1918 No. S. F. No. 8602.Published

Before: Sloss

Synopsis

PROCEEDING- in Certiorari originally instituted in the Supreme Court to review an award of the Industrial Accident Commission. Award annulled.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

SLOSS,

Certiorari to review an award of the Industrial Accident Commission. The- applicant, Prank G-. Pryor, was a bridge carpenter, employed by the petitioner, Leadbettor. On July 22, 1916, he was working at Hermosa Beach. Pryor and a number of other men were handling a heavy “bent,” made of steel, when the bent settled down, crushing Pryor to the ground and resting upon his back. An injury to the ninth dorsal vertebra resulted.

One of the points made by the petitioners, Leadbettor and his insurance carrier, is that the applicant failed to give timely notice of his injury, as required by section 20 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, [Stats. 1913, p. 291], That section contains the proviso, however, “that actual knowledge of such accident and injury on the part of such employer, or his managing agent or superintendent in charge of the work . . . shall be equivalent to such service.” The commission found that the employer had such knowledge, and, we think, there was evidence to warrant this finding. The foreman in charge of the work was present when the accident occurred. After visiting a physician for examination, Pryor returned to his work. Apparently he then thought, as did the foreman, that he had suffered no substantial injury. In fact, he rejected the foreman’s suggestion that a report of the accident be made. The claim of the petitioners is, accordingly, that while the employer had knowledge of the occurrence of an

accident,

neither he nor his foreman was made aware that any

injury

to Pryor had resulted. There is, no doubt, a distinction between the terms “accident” and “injury,” as used in section 20.

(Smith

Industrial Acc. Commission,

174 Cal. 199, [162 Pac. 636].) But the evidence is that for some time after his return Pryor was suffering pain and was not fully able to do his usual work, and that these facts were known to the fore

[470]

man. The commission was, therefore, justified in concluding that the foreman had knowledge that, however slight in degree, some injury had been suffered.

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No question is made of the propriety of allowing the charge of Dr. Hembree, the physician who first examined Pryor. No medical service was provided or tendered at the time of the accident, and the injured man was entitled to consult a physician of his own choice. The briefs discuss to some extent the question of whether the applicant’s conduct on the next day was such as to relieve the employer from any obligation to then furnish medical service. On this question the commission, on its final hearing, decided in favor of the employer, and we must, therefore, start with the assumption that when Pryor went to Porterville the employer had not been guilty of any neglect upon which it could be charged with expenses thereafter to be incurred by him. At that time there was nothing to indicate to Leadbettor or the insurance carrier that Pryor either desired or needed medical attention. The conclusion that there was a subsequent neglect, and a consequent liability to pay for the bills incurred in Portland, is based upon the view that the employer had actual knowledge, while Pryor was in Porterville, that he was receiving further medical treatment, and that the defendants should, upon receiving such knowledge, have immediately offered medical treatment of their own choice. Pryor testified that he had told Leadbettor that he was receiving treatment at Porter-ville. But the commission found that the date of this communication could not be fixed, and made no allowance for the treatment obtained by Pryor at Porterville. On October 16th, when he was leaving for Portland, Pryor wrote a letter to Leadbettor. In it he said: “As for myself, I was injured, while on a job at Hermosa Beach by a bent falling on me. My back was merely examined by Dr. Melvin [a physician at Porterville] and I was sent to an osteopath for treatment. Is the policy made out so I can send the bill to the insurance company, as it hasn’t been paid yet?” Under no reasonable interpretation can it be said that this letter conveyed to its recipient information that Pryor still required medical treatment for his injury. The plain import of the communication is that he had already received the needed treatment. The purpose of the. communication is shown by the closing sentence, in which he inquires whether the bill may be sent to

Synopsis

SLOSS,

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