Allen v. Elliott

WILBUR, J., Concurring.

I concur in the foregoing opinion. With reference to what is said concerning an insane delusion I concur because of the fact that the question as to what constitutes an insane delusion has heretofore been treated by this court as a question of law, and the court has defined, as a matter of law, what constitutes an insane delusion. In this, I think, the court has been in error. An insane delusion is one that is the product of a disordered mind produced because of the disorder. In other words, it is a symptom of a condition of mental' disease. The question of whether or not a person is suffering from mental disease is a question of fact to be determined in the light of increasing medical knowledge. To say that a person is not suffering from an insane delusion because his conduct in ref

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erenee thereto does not measure up to a legal standard is, in my opinion, as fallacious as it would be to say that, as a matter of law, a man does not have syphilis if he does not have the symptoms which were recognized as indicia of the disease before the discovery of the Wassermann test, which, modern research has disclosed, practically demonstrates the existence or nonexistence of syphilis. Insanity is one of the least understood of the ailments which afflict humanity. It is a fertile field for investigation, and happily is receiving that investigation at this time. If the legal definition of an insane delusion can be upheld at all on principle, it is because of the fact that the courts regard other forms of insane- delusions, or of mental disease, as too difficult of proof as a basis for decisions by courts and juries. In that view, and in that view only, do I think that a legal definition of an insane delusion can be upheld on principle, and even in that case we ought not to close the door to such developments of modern research as may be able to make more certain proof of insanity. For illustration, the evidence in this case discloses that the decedent frequently spoke of his daughters as immoral. It is conceded that they were chaste and virtuous. It seems to me that in determining whether or not this should be regarded as the product of a diseased mind, or the outbursts of an unreasonable, eccentric, and angry man, there should be a wider latitude than that given by the accepted definition of an insane delusion.

(Estate of Scott,

128 Cal. 57, [60 Pac. 527].) Doctor Ernest Dozier, who qualified as an expert in this case by testifying that he was doing special scientific investigation in human mental diseases at the Napa State Hospital, and had and continued to have for two years important medical supervision of a large number of insane persons, testified that the deceased was suffering from general paresis, was mentally unsound, and “harbored what seemed to me unsystematized delusions of persecution by all persons.” “An unsystematized delusion is one that is composed of elements that are more or less fleeting and changeable and which