In Re Estate of Haskins

HENSHAW, J.

By the will of Laura J. Haskins, deceased, all of her estate was given to her step-son, George M. Haskins. This will was duly admitted to probate and all probate proceedings thereunder were regularly had and taken. The time came when the estate was ready to be closed, and George M. Haskins, above named, who was also the executor of the estate, filed his final account and report and therewith his petition for distribution. It was set forth, and on the hearing shown, that the estate consisted of $1055.39 in money; that there were no offsets against this amount for claims or credits or disbursements. Erroneously the petition declared that no inheritance tax was chargeable or payable upon the inheritance of George M. Haskins or upon any of the property of the estate. Thereupon the court settled the final account and distributed the whole of the estate to George

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M. Haskins. From this decree the controller of the state appealed, upon the ground that there was an inheritance tax due to the state and that the steps prescribed by law had not been taken in the matter of the appraisement of such inheritance tax and that the decree of distribution made no award to the state of such a tax. Following the taking of this appeal the court, by a

nunc pro tunc

order, corrected the decree of final distribution, the correction consisting in a finding that an inheritance tax of $27.67 was due the state of California; that this sum was “in open court” ordered paid; “that said executor tendered the amount of said inheritance tax to the county treasurer of the county of Los Angeles on the 7th day of October, 1914” (the day upon which the original decree of final distribution was made), and that the county treasurer refused to receive this sum.

It is not in question but that the

amount

of the inheritance tax which the court thus decreed is the amount justly due to the state under the law. (Inheritance Tax Law, 1911, secs. 2, 3 and 4, Stats. 1911, p. 713, et seq.) The

procedure,

however, which the court adopted, it is urged, is so at variance with the law governing the matter as to call for a reversal, with directions to the court in probate to proceed in conformity with that law. To the method of procedure laid down we are thus brought.