Lassen Irrigation Co. v. Superior Court of Lassen Cty. (1907) · DecisionDepot

Lassen Irrigation Co. v. Superior Court of Lassen Cty.

Name: California Superior Court Tentative Rulings
Creator: DecisionDepot
License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/

California Supreme Court May 28, 1907 No. S.F. No. 4695.Published

Before: Shaw

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Holding. A judge is not disqualified from presiding over a case due to interest or bias simply because they hold a prior water right that may be incidentally referenced in evidence, particularly when the judgment will not legally affect the judge's own property rights. Furthermore, a party cannot seek disqualification based on alleged bias that would favor their own position.

Issues

Whether a judge is disqualified by interest when their own property rights might be incidentally referenced in evidence during a trial between other parties.
Whether a party can seek a writ of prohibition based on the claim that a judge is biased in their favor.

Disposition. denied

Synopsis

APPLICATION for a Writ of Prohibition to the Superior Court of Lassen County. Frank A. Kelley, Judge.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

SHAW, J.

This is a proceeding in prohibition to prevent the respondent Hon. Frank A. Kelley, as judge of the superior court of Lassen County, from presiding in the trial of the case of A. E. Torrey

Lassen Irrigation Company, pending in said court. The basis of the petition is that

[359]

said Frank A. Kelley is disqualified to act as judge on the trial of said case, by reason of interest and bias. We will assume, for the purposes of the decision, that the facts stated in the petition to demonstrate that the remedy by appeal is inadequate are sufficient for that purpose, and we will consider the case upon its merits.

The complaint of Torrey, in the suit 'against the Lassen Irrigation Company, states a cause of action for damages only. It alleges, in substance, that the company is engaged in the business of diverting water from Susan River, by means of storage reservoirs and diverting dams, and of selling said water to the owners of the lands within the district to which the use of said water is appropriated, for the irrigation of their lands; that Torrey was entitled to receive from said company, during the irrigating season of 1905, for the irrigation of his land, consisting of forty acres, a certain quantity of said water; that there was in Susan River and in the reservoirs of the company, during said season, sufficient water belonging to said company to supply all its customers, including Torrey, with the water to which they were* respectively entitled, but that the company failed and refused to deliver any water to Torrey, whereby he was damaged, by the loss of crops, in a large sum of money, for which judgment is asked.

The complaint also includes a prayer that the amount of water to which the plaintiff, Torrey, is entitled from the defendant, be determined, and that his title thereto be quieted. But no facts are alleged as a foundation for such relief. The complaint shows that the amount of water to he delivered by the company to Torrey was fixed by written contract by definite measurement, the maximum quantity being eighteen acre inches each year, but not exceeding the amount necessary to irrigate the forty acres of land in question. It is riot alleged that there is any dispute whatever between the parties concerning the quantity of water due to the plaintiff, Torrey, from the company, nor that the company has ever denied his right to the amount fixed by the contract, or his due proportion of the ariiount, in case the supply from the river proved insufficient for all those entitled. And as the only breach of duty alleged was the refusal to deliver the water for the year 1905, and it is

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which would justify the court in determining the rights of these parties, or which would require an adjudication of their rights. And for similar reasons, it did not show that Frank A. Kelley, or any of the other owners of the prior rights, were interested in the determination of the ease of Torrey against the Lassen Irrigation Company. The company could defend that action by showing that the plaintiff did not have an absolute right to a certain amount of water, but only a right to a share of such water as the company itself was entitled to take from the river, and that his share of the water the company could obtain was delivered to him, or that, by reason of circumstances beyond his control and for which it was not legally responsible, its supply had failed. It could show, in defense, that after the parties having preferred rights had taken their portion of the water, there was none left, or not enough to supply Torrey. This might make it necessary to prove .at the trial the amount to which Judge Kelley had the prior right and the amount he actually took in pursuance thereof. It may be conceded that in weighing such evidence the judge might not be entirely unprejudiced. Nevertheless, the fact that he would be required to weigh the evidence and determine the fact does not make him legally interested in the action, nor in the result thereof. It was not an action against him, and no judgment which he could render therein would in the least determine, or affect, his own property rights or interests. The only judgment that could properly be given in the action would be a judgment in favor of the plaintiff for such damages as the court should find he had suffered by the deprivation of the water, or a judgment in favor of the defendant, that the plaintiff take nothing. No adjudication as to the relative rights of the defendant company and the other persons alleged to have or claim prior rights in the river would have been proper. The interest in an o action which disqualifies a judge who possesses it from trying the cause is a property or personal interest, an interest, in the event of the suit, in the judgment which may be rendered therein. It must affect him, either in person or property, directly or indirectly. A mere sentimental interest, or an interest in the facts which the issues make it necessary for him to determine, which may tend to induce him

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Synopsis

SHAW, J.

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