Upton v. Travelers Ins. Co.
Before: Shaw
Synopsis
- The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
SHAW, J.
The plaintiff appeals from the judgment. ■ The action was upon a contract to insure the plaintiff against accidents. The policy was issued on April 12, 1912, and bore that date. It contained the provision that, “this policy is issued for a term of six months, beginning at 12 o’clock noon, standard time, on the twelfth day of April, 1912,
[729]
and ending at the same hour, but it may be renewed, subject to all its provisions, from term to term thereafter by payment of the premium in advance.” It was renewed from time to time, the last renewal taking place on April 12, 1914. The accident causing the injury for which plaintiff seeks recovery in this action occurred on October 13,1914. This was one day after the policy had expired and consequently the defendant is not liable. The fact that October 12th was a legal holiday does not aid the plaintiff. The policy expired by its terms on the twelfth day of October at noon. The accident does not come within the provisions of sections 10 or 11 of the Civil Code or the corresponding provisions of the other codes. Section 10 declares that the time in which any act is provided by law to be done is computed by excluding the first day and including the last, unless the last day is a holiday and then it is also excluded. The accident, of course, was not an act provided to be done by any law, or by the policy. Therefore this section has no application. Section 11 provides that whenever any act of a secular nature is appointed by law or contract to be performed upon a particular day, which day falls upon a holiday, it may be performed upon the next business. day with the same effect as if it had been performed upon the day appointed. The policy did not appoint the accident as an act to be performed at any time, or at all, consequently that act does not fall within this section.
The fact that the policy contained an option to the plaintiff to renew the policy, and that this option continued in force by the terms of the policy until October 12, 1914, does not extend the policy so as to cover an accident which happened on the following day. Section 11 does not purport to do more than to extend the time for exercising the option where it expires on a holiday. As a matter of fact, there was never any exercise of the option nor any attempt to exercise it. Consequently, such extension of the time for exercising it could have no effect whatever after the extension had expired, even if the accident did happen before that time. An option is a mere offer, and unless it is accepted within the time limited, it is of no force for any purpose. The mere existence of such unexercised option, extending beyond the period of insurance specified in the policy, cannot operate to extend the period of insurance so as to cover an accident which happens between the expiration of the insurance and the termination of the option.
More from California Supreme Court
- People v. Wende (1979)
- People v. Watson (1956)
- People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996)
- People v. Kelly (2006)
- Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962)
- Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001)
- People v. Lewis (2021)
- In Re Estrada (1965)
- Denham v. Superior Court (1970)
- People v. Marsden (1970)