Cook v. Miller
Before: Shaw
Synopsis
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
SHAW, J.
Plaintiff recovered judgment against defendant for damages to his person and to his property. The defendant’s motion for new trial was denied. The appeal is from the judgment and from an order denying the motion for new trial. The appeal was mistakenly taken to the district court of appeal of the second district, which court, discovering the mistake, transferred it" to this court.
The damages were caused by a collision between a motorcycle which plaintiff was riding and operating and an automobile driven by the defendant. It occurred in the city of Los Angeles at the intersection of Washington Street, running east and west, and Griffith Avenue, running north and south. The complaint alleges that the injuries which caused the damages were the result of the negligence of the defendant. The answer alleged contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff. It cannot be seriously disputed that the evidence is sufficient to support the finding that the defendant’s negligence was a proximate cause of the injury. The principal point made in support of the appeal is that the evidence showed that the plaintiff was also negligent in operating his motorcycle at the time of the collision, and that his
[499]
negligence contributed to his injury and was one of the proximate causes thereof.
There was at that time an ordinance of the city of Los Angeles in force regulating the use and operation of vehicles, including motorcycles and automobiles, on the streets, in effect as follows: The person driving such vehicle on the street was required to do so “in a careful manner and with due regard for the safety and convenience of pedestrians or other vehicles on such street.” (Section 5.) In overtaking and passing another vehicle on the street he was required to pass to the left of such vehicle and not to drive again to the right until he was clear of such vehicle. (Section 8.) He was required to travel on the right-hand side of the street and as near the curb as possible. (Section 6.) In turning from one street into another he was to pass around to the right of, and beyond the center of, the street intersection. Vehicles traveling upon a street running northerly and southerly had the right of way over vehicles traveling upon a street running easterly or westerly. A driver of a vehicle running on an easterly or westerly street was required to allow the other vehicle such right of way. (Section 40.) The speed limit was fixed at not exceeding twenty miles an hour in the district embracing the place of collision. There does not appear to be anything in the ordinance requiring the sounding of a bell, gong, or horn at an intersection, although it does require such vehicles to have a bell, gong, or horn attached and in good working order.
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