People v. McGlade

McFARLAND, J.

The defendant was convicted of forgery, and appeals from the judgment, from an order denying, his motion for a new trial, and from an order denying his motion in arrest of judgment.

Appellant contends for a reversal on several grounds, but, in our opinion, no one of them is tenable. The main point relied on is the insufficiency of the indictment. Appellant is charged with forging and uttering “a certain instrument in writing, to wit, a certain demand on the treasury of the city and county of San Francisco aforesaid; and said instrument in writing, to wit, said demand on the treasury of said city and county of San Francisco, was then and there, and is, in the words and figures following, to wit:” And then follows

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a copy of the instrument. The instrument is dated “San Francisco, August 31, 1898,” and commences: “J. Sullivan presents this demand on the treasury of the city and county of San Francisco, for the sum of ninety-six dollars, being for labor which he has performed for said city and county,” at places -and dates specified, the claim being for twenty-six days’ work at four dollars per day for the street department of said city and county. Then follows a certificate of “Thos. F. Clark, Deputy Supt. of Public Streets,” that “the foregoing is a true and correct account of work performed for the city and county.” There is also, as part of the instrument, a verification of the claim subscribed by Sullivan and sworn to before “F. B. McGinnis, Deputy Clerk, Board of Supervisors,” whose'name is signed to the jurat. There are also the words, “Approved September 30, 1898, sundry funds, payable out of the street department fund. W. Broderick, City and County Auditor.” The indictment also contains a copy of the back of the instrument which shows approval and allowance of the claim by certain officers of the city and county, and, also, “Received payment, Jno. Sullivan.” It is. averred that the instrument was forged, etc.; with intent to defraud the city and county of San Francisco, and that the demand was and is one which the board of supervisors and treasurer of said city and county were authorized by law to allow and pay, if genuine and true.

It is contended that the instrument above described, and called a “demand,” is not of the instruments enumerated in section 4.70 of the Penal Code, and therefore not the subject of forgery. It is true that the word “demand” does not ap-