In Re Pantages

PRESTON, J.

The petitioner, following his conviction of the crime of rape, was on November 9, 1929, sentenced to the state prison at San Quentin for the term prescribed by law. He was immediately taken into custody by the sheriff of the county of Los Angeles and has been detained in the county jail there continuously since said date.

He has duly appealed from said judgment of conviction to the District Court of Appeal, where the cause is now pending and has either been submitted or is in a condition to be submitted to that tribunal for decision. The execution of said judgment of conviction has been regularly stayed by certificate of probable cause issued pursuant to the provisions of section 1243 of the Penal Code.

Admittedly “said appeal is taken and prosecuted by the said Alexander Pantages in good faith, is not frivolous, vexatious nor for delay, but presents important and debatable questions for the decision of the District Court of Appeal, and is taken in good faith and without any intent or desire to delay or hinder the due processes of the law.”

Heretofore, on December 27, 1929; again on January 30, 1930, and still again on April 16, 1930, the Superior Court of the county of Los Angeles gave and made orders denying, without prejudice, motions made by said petitioner for bail pending his appeal. On April 8, 1930, the District Court of Appeal, Division One of the Second Appellate District, likewise denied a similar motion. Petitioner now appeals to the original jurisdiction of this court and asks that an order be made granting unto him bail pending the decision on said appeal.

The generally accepted rule is that courts and judges should not exercise the power to grant bail after conviction of a felony except “with the greatest caution and only when the peculiar circumstances of the ease render it proper.” At the same time the laws of the state should be administered in a humane manner and it is for that reason that the power to grant bail in a proper case is conferred upon courts and judges. Where the showing of fact is sufficient to meet the above requirement, judges and courts should not hesitate to give the benefit of the law to a

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defendant. In