Liebrandt v. Sorg
Before: Garoutte
Synopsis
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
GAROUTTE, J.
Plaintiff recovered judgment in the sum of four thousand five hundred dollars, damages for a breach of a contract of marriage, and defendant has appealed from
[572]
both the judgment and order denying his motion for a new trial.
It is first contended that the evidence tending to show an agreement to marry is insufficient to support the verdict. The statement of the plaintiff was directly to the point that such a contract was agreed upon. The evidence of the witness Mrs. Wenks was also to the same effect, and there was other evidence corroborating strongly the statements of the aforesaid witnesses. The veracity of these witnesses is attacked, not by other evidence, but by the briefs of counsel alone. It is urged that their testimony is improbable, and therefore should be rejected. While cases might arise where this court would declare the evidence of a witness so improbable as not entitled to belief, yet a case of that character would be most exceptional, and it is not presented by this record. Under the evidence here disclosed, it was essentially for the jury to decide the fact as to the existence or non-existence of an agreement to marry.
Plaintiff, under objection by defendant, answered affirmatively the following question: “Did you ever tell anybody about your contemplated marriage with Sorg?” A second witness, under objection by defendant, answered affirmatively the following question: “Did Mrs. Liebrandt at that time say to you that she was to marry Mr. Sorg?” It is elementary law that evidence of this character is inadmissible as tending to prove the agreement to marry. But this character of evidence is admissible as tending to increase plaintiff’s damages, occasioned by a breach of the contract, and it was upon this theory that it was offered and admitted before the jury. This is apparent from the declaration made by the court in overruling the first objection, wherein the judge said: “ It is not admitted for the purpose of proving a promise of marriage on the part of the defendant, but it is admissible to show the humiliation on the part of plaintiff.” This character of evidence is always admitted after a
prima facie
showing of the existence of the agreement to marry, and a breach thereof. It is admitted as tending to establish an element of damage,— to wit, humiliation to plaintiff’s feelings.
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