Estate of Cahill

VAN DYKE, J.

The appeal in this case is taken from an order denying a motion of the appellants herein to vacate in part a certain order made by the said court setting apart a homestead to said Anastasia Cahill.

The respondent moves to dismiss the appeal so taken, on the ground that the order appealed from is not an appealable order, and we think the motion must be granted.

The constitution confers upon this court general .appellate jurisdiction in many matters, but in probate proceedings the language conferring jurisdiction reads: “And in all such probate matters as may be provided by law.” (Art. VI, sec. . 4.) It results, therefore, that this court has only such juris-Z diction in probate matters as may be provided by law. The

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appellate jurisdiction in probate matters is prescribed in the third subdivision of section 963 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and there is no provision in that subdivision or elsewhere allowing an appeal from such an order as the one here involved. This question has been before the court in numerous cases, and uniformly decided adversely to the contention of the appellants herein. In

Estate of Wittmeier,

118 Cal. 255, it is said: “Appeals in probate proceedings lie only from such orders and decrees as are enumerated in section 963, subdivision 3, of the Code of Civil Procedure.

(Estate of Calahan,

60 Cal. 232;

Estate of Lutz,

67 Cal. 457;

Estate of Wiard,

83 Cal. 619.) The provisions of subdivision 2 of section 963, relative to appeals from orders made after final judgment, „ are not applicable to probate proceedings.

(Estate of Calahan,

60 Cal. 232;

Estate of Walkerly,

94 Cal. 352;