City of Los Angeles v. Krutz

HENSHAW, J.

The city of Los Angeles condemned a certain piece of land, part of a larger tract. Dispute having arisen between defendants Wm. G. Krutz, Jr., and the Nebraska & California Real Estate Company, a corporation, over the right to moneys arising under the condemnation proceedings, the city of Los Angeles interpleaded these defendants to have those rights determined. Defendant and respondent Krutz filed his answer and cross-complaint against the codefendant, Nebraska & California Real Estate Company, and by stipulation the action was tried upon this cross-complaint and the corporation’s answer thereto, the city of Los Angeles being thus eliminated from the controversy. The respondent Krutz pleaded compliance upon his part with the terms of an executory contract for sale by the defendant corporation to him of the tract of land, a part of which, as has been said, was condemned by the city. He sought a decree of specific performance and an award to the defendant corporation of so much of the condemnation fund as was necessary to pay the corporation the balance of the purchase price of the land. The corporation defended, asserting that Krutz, by failure and neglect to make the payments provided, had lost all his rights under the contract. It sought a decree accordingly and a payment of the condemnation fund to it. The court’s judgment was in favor of Krutz contention and the corporation appeals.

The contract between the parties provided as follows: “In case said party of the second part (respondent) shall refuse, neglect, or fail to pay such purchase money and interest as above stated and agreed, he shall forfeit any and all rights in and to said real estate acquired under and by virtue of this agreement, and shall forfeit any money paid for the purchase of the same, unless said party of the first part shall elect otherwise.” Defendant showed that before the time when the remainder of the purchase price was due under the original contract, negotiations were had, culminating in a supplemental agreement whereby it extended the original agreement for the period of ninety days in consideration of

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the payment of three thousand dollars, to be applied upon the purchase price; that the contract as thus extended, fixed the last day of payment on June 17, 1909; that the payment was not made on that date, and on September 20, 1909, it exercised its option and declared a forfeiture. Appellant contends that under the equitable principle as expounded in