Crossman v. Vivienda Water Co.

California Supreme Court Jun 16, 1902 No. L.A. No. 1015.Published

Before: Chipman

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Holding. The court held that a clerk lacks the authority to enter a default judgment in an action requiring an accounting to determine damages, rendering such a judgment void on its face. Consequently, the trial court properly vacated the judgment upon a motion by interested parties.

Issues

Whether a clerk has the authority under section 585 of the Code of Civil Procedure to enter a default judgment in an action requiring an accounting.
Whether a default judgment entered by a clerk in an action requiring an accounting is void on its face.
Whether stockholders have standing to move to set aside a default judgment against a corporation when they are named as defendants and successors in interest.

Disposition. affirmed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“The clerk acts only in a ministerial capacity, and exercises no judicial functions in proceeding under section 585, and his authority is only such as is expressly conferred on him by the statute.”

“A judgment void upon its face is one that appears to be void by an inspection of the judgment-roll.”

Synopsis

Action against Water Company—Accounting of Sales—Damages for Breach of Contract—Default—Void Clerk’s Judgment.—The clerk in entering defaults and judgments by default acts only in a ministerial capacity in the cases expressly provided by statute, and has no judicial functions; and in an action necessarily involving an accounting of the net proceeds of all sales of water obtained by a corporation defendant, over and above the payment of all expenses of developing, conveying, and marketing the water, under certain written contracts, the breach of which is alleged, the clerk had no authority to enter a judgment by default for the gross amount of damages alleged in the complaint, and sneh judgment is void upon its face, and may be set aside upon motion.

Id.—Motion of Stockholders to Vacate Clerk’s Judgment.—Defendant stockholders of the water company who are sued upon their stockholder’s liability under the contracts alleged, and who are also alleged to have received certain conveyances from the water company, before the judgment was entered, have sufficient interest to sustain a motion by them to vacate the void clerk’s judgment against the water company.

CHIPMAN, C.

This is an appeal by plaintiff from an order vacating a default judgment against defendant company. The complaint was filed April 28,1894, in which plaintiff sought certain relief from defendant company on a contract made part of the complaint; certain stockholders of the company were made defendants to recover from them the proportionate share of the amount sought to be recovered

[572]

from the company. Summons was served on the company August 15, 1894, and on August 24, 1894, the company and certain of defendant stockholders appeared by demurrer to the complaint. The demurrer was overruled December 15, 1894, and on February 1, 1895, an answer was filed for all the stockholders, but no answer was made for the company, nor did it appear otherwise than by demurrer. On December 4, 1896, plaintiff caused a default and judgment to be entered by the clerk against the company. On January 23, 1899, defendants, the stockholders, filed a motion to set aside and cancel the judgment. One ground of the motion, among others, was, that the alleged cause of action is primarily against the company for an accounting, and also for damages, and is not a cause of action authorizing the entry of judgment by the clerk, but is one which can only be entered upon an order of the court.

We think the point is well taken and that the court rightly set aside the judgment. •

It becomes necessary to state the nature of the action. The complaint alleges that one Raynor entered into a certain contract with the company on October 14, 1899, which is made part of the complaint, as Exhibit A; that on the same day the company made a contract with Ezra Crossman, which is also made part of the complaint, as Exhibit B, and it is alleged that by proper assignments this latter contract was transferred to plaintiff. Exhibit A purports to be a contract between Raynor, first party, and Shirley C. Ward, for the corporation, second party, and by it first party grants “all his right . . . to the waters now flowing from the following properties [describing certain lands known as the Meeks Mill property, 110 acres], and also from a certain property [18½ acres] known as the Garner Place, adjoining the Meeks Mill property; also all undeveloped water obtainable on these properties, with rights of way, right to tunnel, bore, ditch, and the like privileges; second party agreed to enter at once upon the work of developing water and to convey it to certain places, and was to have full control of the management of the work and “of the sales and disposition of the waters aforementioned.” First party made certain reservations of rights not necessary to be stated. Exhibit B is a transfer by Ward, for the corporation, to Ezra Crossman, “of an undivided one

Crossman v. Vivienda Water Co.

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Synopsis

CHIPMAN, C.

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