Stewart v. Chase

California Supreme Court Mar 16, 1915 No. L.A. No. 3924.Published

Before: Henshaw

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Holding. The court held that principles of res judicata and estoppel by judgment are applicable to the probate of a foreign will, and that a final injunctive judgment prohibiting a party from offering such a will for probate is binding and enforceable.

Issues

Whether a final injunctive judgment prohibiting a party from offering a foreign will for probate constitutes a valid ground of contest against the probate of that will.
Whether the full faith and credit clause requires the court to ignore a local injunctive judgment that estops a party from seeking probate of a foreign will.

Disposition. affirmed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“it would be beyond reason to hold that in the enumeration of these specific grounds of contest the law meant to declare that the principles of res judicata and estoppel by judgment were inapplicable in such a contest.”

Synopsis

Probate op Foreign Will—Contest—Standing on Demurrer—Admission op Truth op Allegations.—The proponent of a foreign will to which a contest has been interposed, by standing upon his demurrer to the contest after the same has been overruled, and refusing to answer, admits the truth of all the allegations well pleaded in the contest.

Id.—Bes Judicata and Estoppel by Judgment—Principles op are Applicable to Bar Probate op Foreign Will.—Although the code does not say, in express terms, that estoppel by judgment may be urged to bar the probate of a foreign will, and although it specifies the general grounds for contesting probate, it cannot be held that in the enumeration of these specific grounds of contest the law meant to declare that the principles of res judicata and estoppel by judgment are inapplicable in such a contest; on the contrary, such principles are applicable in a case where the probate has been specifically forbidden by a final decree in equity.

HENSHAW, J.

There was offered for probate in the superior court of the county of Los Angeles a foreign will of Florence E. Chase, deceased, which will, it was averred, had been duly admitted to probate in the probate court of the county of Penobscot, state of Maine, of which state it was also alleged Florence E. Chase was a resident at the time of her death. Elinor A. Chase Stevens was the sole devisee and beneficiary under this will. The petitioner for the probate thereof, Paul Stewart, asserts an interest in the will through assignment from Elinor A. Chase Stevens.

[626]

This offer was met by a contest instituted by the beneficiaries under the will of Horace W. Chase, deceased, who in his lifetime had been a brother of Florence E. Chase, deceased. In their contest they alleged that another will of Florence E. Chase, deceased, had been duly admitted to probate in the superior court of Los Angeles

County;

that by this will the property left by Florence E. Chase' was to be disposed of precisely as was the property of her brother Horace W. Chase; that they were beneficiaries under the will of Horace W. Chase, deceased, and thus interested in the will of Florence E. Chase; that to this will a contest had been instituted by Elinor A. Chase Stevens and Paul Stewart, and that their contest had been dismissed. In this contest Elinor A. Chase Stevens and Paul Stewart offered for probate this foreign will of Florence E. Chase. Further, the contestants pleaded an injunctive judgment obtained by them in an action prosecuted against Elinor A. Chase Stevens and Paul Stewart by which judgment Elinor A. Chase Stevens “and all her counselors, attorneys, solicitors and agents and all others acting in aid or assistance of her, were required to absolutely desist and refrain from presenting for probate in this superior court the said alleged will of Florence E. Chase, deceased, purporting to be dated February 17, 1912, and alleged to have been admitted to probate in the probate court of the county of Penobscot, state of Maine, on the 29th day of May, 1912, and also were required to absolutely desist and refrain from in any way contesting the will of said Florence E. Chase, deceased, heretofore admitted to probate in this superior court on the twenty-fourth day of May, 1912; that the said judgment of said court was duly entered in said court in March, 1913; that thereafter, after the entry of said judgment against said Elinor A.- Chase Stevens, she moved said court to vacate and set aside the said judgment, which said motion was denied by said court, and the said judgment against the said Elinor A. Chase Stevens, and the said order denying the same have become final and no appeal has been taken therefrom.” The order of the court in probate dismissing the contest of Elinor A. Chase Stevens and Paul Stewart, seeking a revocation of the probate of the will of Florence E. Chase, was made after and in pursuance of this judgment.

Stewart v. Chase

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Synopsis

HENSHAW, J.

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