Wessel v. Superior Court

ANGBLLOTTI, C. J.

Plaintiff made application to the district court of appeal of the second appellate district for a writ of prohibition restraining defendants from proceeding further in the action of said Wessel against Waite et al., instituted in the superior court of Imperial County on or about June 27, 1917, on the ground that said court was without jurisdiction of said cause. An alternative writ of prohibition was issued, and a return being made, the matter was heard by the district court of appeal. The justices of that court were unable to agree upon a judgment, and the proceeding was transferred to this court.

The action of Wessel

v.

Waite et al., which was one to prevent the enforcement of what was substantially alleged to be an invalid ordinance of the city of Imperial, was commenced in the superior court of Imperial County. We shall assume that it was transferred, under stipulation of the parties, to the superior court of Los Angeles County, although it must be confessed that the proceedings looking to that end were somewhat informal. The superior court of Los Angeles County assumed jurisdiction, passed upon the demurrer to the complaint and issued a temporary injunction restraining the enforcement of the ordinance. Subsequently, as its minutes for August 27, 1917, show, it allowed a motion for judgment on the pleadings to be withdrawn, and denied a motion to vacate the injunction. The minutes then proceed as follows: "Thereupon the court, of its own motion, with the consent of the defendants and over the objection of the plaintiff, ordered the cause herein transferred from this court to the superior court of Imperial County, California, for further proceedings.” It is on this order of transfer that defendants base their claim of present jurisdiction of the action. Plaintiff claims that this order is a nullity, with the result that the action is still pending in the superior court of Los Angeles County.

The attack thus made by plaintiff on the order of transfer is a collateral attack on an order of a court of general juris

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diction. Unless, therefore, the order is void on the face of the record, it is clear that, in view of well-settled principles, it must be held, in so far at least as this proceeding is concerned, to fully vest jurisdiction of the cause in the superior court of Imperial County. That the order cannot be held void on its face is, we think, settled by decisions made by this court.