Irving v. State Bar

THE COURT.

This is a proceeding to review an order of the Board of Governors of The State Bar of California recommending that the petitioner be suspended from the practice of law in this state for a period of one year.

The evidence upon which the sentence of suspension was based is similar to that in

Howe

v.

State Bar,

212 Cal. 222 [298 Pac. 25], decided April 1st of this year, in which the recommendation that Howe be' suspended for a period of two years was followed by this court. Both Howe and petitioner were connected with the West Coast Claims Bureau, under which fictitious name one M. B. Rose conducted a business for the settlement of claims for personal injuries on behalf of injured persons against defendants who carried liability insurance, which practice is commonly known as “ambulance chasing”. Howe was connected with the San Francisco branch of the bureau, petitioner with the Los Angeles office. Petitioner testified to re

[83]

ceiving a percentage of the fee paid the bureau in some cases, while Howe stated upon his hearing that he was always paid a fixed sum for his services. Petitioner’s connection with the bureau began in June, 1928, and continued to the time the present charges were filed against him in January, 1930. During that time petitioner was employed by the bureau in the majority of, if not in all, cases in the Los Angeles office in which the owner of the bureau deemed the services of an attorney necessary. For a complete statement of the agency’s method of doing business and the capacity in which petitioner and Howe were employed by it, reference is hereby made to the statement of facts in the Howe case, which we deem it unnecessary to repeat in the case herein.

On January 27, 1930, four verified complaints were filed against petitioner by the Los Angeles Bar Association, each charging a violation of rule III of the Buies of Professional Conduct adopted by The State Bar in regard to four separate claims for personal injuries. At the conclusion of the hearings held upon said complaints, the committee granted permission to its examiner to amend said complaints to conform to proof by charging that petitioner’s conduct also violated rule X of the Buies of Professional Conduct and subdivisions 3 and 4 of section 287, Code of Civil Procedure, but the amendments were never made.