Guardianship of Salter
Before: Lorigan
Synopsis
Guardian and Ward—Appointment op Guardian—Special Proceeding —Bight op Father to Letters.—The court in appointing a guardian of a minor does not act in the exercise of its general equity powers, but acts in a special proceeding, and by virtue of the statutory power conferred upon it to appoint guardians in certain designated eases, under sections 1747 to 1751 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and where it appears that the father of a minor under . fourteen years is competent to act as his guardian he is entitled to letters of guardianship to the exclusion of the grandmother of the child.
Id.—Health op Child.—The right of the father, being competent, to have the custody and control of a child under fourteen years of age is not affected by a finding as to the health of the child, and the better opportunity he would have for fresh air and exercise at the home of his grandmother than at the residence of his father in a city.
LORIGAN, J.
Johnson, maternal grandmother of the above minor, a child five years of age, applied to the superior court of Los Angeles for appointment as his guardian, alleging in her petition that his father had abandoned him, and that he was not a fit and proper person to have the care and custody of the child.
Charles E. Salter, the father of the minor, opposed the application of the grandmother, and himself petitioned for appointment as guardian.
The matter coming on for hearing, the court found that the father had not abandoned his child; that he was a fit and proper person to have his care and custody; and that his wife
[413]
(the mother of the child was dead, and the father had remarried) was also a fit and proper person to have such custody. The court further found that the child was in delicate health, and required the constant watching of a competent and experienced person; that his health and welfare would be better promoted by being placed for the greater part of the time in the custody of his grandmother; that the grandmother had a home in Pasadena where the child could be kept and get the benefit of fresh air and exercise, whereas, if left in the custody of his father, he would have no opportunity of being outdoors, except upon the public streets of the city of Los Angeles.
The court thereupon appointed the grandmother guardian, incorporating in the decree a condition that the father each week be permitted to have charge of the child from Saturday morning till the Monday morning ensuing.
This appeal is taken by the father from the order appointing the grandmother such guardian, and, in our opinion, must be sustained.
Counsel for respondent discourses learnedly in support of the order upon the power of courts of equity in England and in this country in matters of guardianship, but we cannot see that this discussion has any application to the matter under consideration. The court in this matter was not acting in the exercise of its general equity powers or as an equitable tribunal when it made the order under review. It was acting strictly in a special proceeding and by virtue of power conferred upon it to appoint guardians in certain designated cases. (Code Civ. Proc., secs. 1747-1751.) And the validity of the order which it made in this case must be determined solely from a consideration of those sections, and particularly of section 1751.
More from California Supreme Court
- People v. Wende (1979)
- People v. Watson (1956)
- People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996)
- People v. Kelly (2006)
- Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962)
- Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001)
- People v. Lewis (2021)
- In Re Estrada (1965)
- Denham v. Superior Court (1970)
- People v. Marsden (1970)