Vance v. Smith

VAN DYKE. J.

—In February, 1895, S. L. Vance was appointed administrator of the estate of his. deceased wife, Eliza M. Vance, but died before any accounting had. For the purpose of having his account as administrator of the said estate settled, the plaintiff, as administratrix on his estate, brought this action, in the nature of a suit in equity, against Bertha A. Smith, the daughter of his deceased wife, Eliza M. Vance, by a former marriage, and who had been appointed administratrix of her mother’s estate. On the hearing of the case, the court below found that said S. L. Vance, deceased, had in his hands, as administrator, and belonging to the estate of his deceased wife, Eliza M. Vance, a balance, in money, of $1,093, and personal property, a watch and chain,

[511]

and some trinkets, amounting to $11.50,—in all, $1,104.50,—■ and thereupon the court entered judgment in favor of the defendant as administratrix of the estate of Eliza M. Vance, and against the plaintiff as administratrix of the estate of S. L. Vance, for said sum, but failed to direct how or by whom such judgment should be paid. On appeal to this court the cause was remanded, with directions to modify the judgment by adding thereto the following: “And that said judgment be paid in due course of administration,” and as so modified the judgment was affirmed.

(Vance

v.

Smith,

124 Cal. 219.) Upon the

remittitur

going down, the court below, June 6,1899, on motion of the defendant, and after hearing the parties, entered an order directing “the plaintiff, Clara M. Vance, as administratrix of the estate of S,. L. Vance, deceased, to pay to the defendant, Bertha A. Smith, as administratrix of the estate of Eliza M. Vance, deceased, the amount of the judgment heretofore given and entered in said action in favor of said defendant and against said plaintiff for the sum of $1,093, with interest thereon at the rate of seven per cent per annum from June 12, 1897, on or before the twelfth day of June, 1899, and said plaintiff is further ordered to deliver to said defendant on or before the twelfth day of June, 1899, one certain bird-cage, certain trinkets, and one watch and chain, all of which are named and specified in said judgment.” The present appeal is taken from this order.