Hall v. Bartlett

This is an action in ejectment in which judgment went for defendants and plaintiff appeals therefrom on a bill of exceptions.

The complaint alleged ownership in the plaintiff and right of possession to "all that certain lot and parcel of land situate in the city of Los Angeles, county of Los Angeles, and state of California, and described as follows to wit: Lot ten (10) of block `V' of the Mott tract as per map of said tract recorded in book 14, page 7, miscellaneous records of said county, excepting *Page 640 therefrom any portion thereof included in Figueroa Street, formerly Pearl Street, as indicated upon a plat of block `V' of the said Mott tract recorded in book 53, page 21, miscellaneous records of said Los Angeles County."

The answer denied title or right of possession in plaintiff and set up that defendants were tenants of one E.R. Fox whom they allege was the owner of the property and entitled to its possession.

On the trial plaintiff in support of his title introduced a judgment-roll in an action entitled William M. Peckham et al. v. E.R. Fox in the superior court of Los Angeles County in which plaintiff was awarded a money judgment and a decree foreclosing a lien (its nature does not appear) on certain real property in the city of Los Angeles described in the judgment, which property was directed to be sold. The property so ordered to be sold was described as situated in the city of Los Angeles and described as follows: "Being part of lot ten of block `V' of the Mott tract, the same being the lot on the corner of First Street on the east side of Figueroa Street, being sixty-five feet front by one hundred and sixty-five feet deep and a two-story frame house situate thereon."

The return of the sheriff to an order of sale issued pursuant to the decree showed that the property as described in the judgment was sold to plaintiff. Two deeds made by the sheriff to the plaintiff as purchaser at the sale were also offered by counsel for plaintiff, but at this stage simply for the purposes of identification. In them the property sold was described as "all that certain lot, piece or parcel of land situate, lying and being in the city of Los Angeles, county of Los Angeles and state of California, and bounded and particularly described as follows, to wit:" (here follows the identical description contained in the judgment and heretofore quoted therefrom). The second deed was made simply to correct an error in the execution and acknowledgment of the first.

In aid of the deeds plaintiff then introduced in evidence both the map and plat referred to in his description of the property as set forth in his complaint. The map of the Mott tract showed a lot 10 of block "V" of that tract to be a lot fronting sixty feet on Grasshopper (now Figueroa Street) with a depth of one hundred and sixty-five feet and being *Page 641 located sixty feet from First Street; and a lot 9 of the same dimensions lying between it and First Street and fronting on Figueroa and First streets. The plat of block "V" of said tract (referred to in the complaint as recorded in book 53, page 21), does not identify either of said lots 9 or 10 but shows the two lots nearest the corner of Pearl (now Figueroa) and First streets, fronting on Pearl Street, to be each 60 feet wide and 163.28 feet deep. This offer of the plat and map was supplemented by testimony showing that there were no other plats or maps of the Mott tract recorded in the office of the county recorder of Los Angeles County; that the name of Grasshopper Street had been changed to Pearl and this in turn to Figueroa, and plaintiff himself testified that there was no two-story frame house on the lot at the corner of First and Figueroa, but that there was such a house on lot 10 of block "V" of the Mott tract, that is on the lot next to the corner. After this proof plaintiff then offered in evidence the second deed executed by the sheriff (corrective of the first) and which had theretofore been marked for identification only, to which the defendants objected on the ground that the description in the sheriff's deed offered varied from the description in the complaint and for the additional reason that the description in it was so uncertain that it did not describe any property and the property could not be identified thereby. The trial court sustained these objections to the deed and rendered judgment in favor of the defendant.