Denninger v. Recorder's Court of Pomona
Before: Beatty, Angellotti, Shaw
Synopsis
Municipal Corporation—Power to Regulate Gas-Rate—Validity of Ordinance—Constitutional Law.—A municipal ordinance in a county of the fifth class fixing a maximum rate for gas, and providing a punishment for violation of the same, is valid under section 19 of article XI of the constitution, construed in connection with the Municipal Corporation Act.
Id.—Certiorari-—Gas for Cooking, Heating, and Illuminating Purposes—Conviction—Jurisdiction of Recorder’s Court.—A writ of certiorari will not lie to review and annul a conviction under such ordinance under a complaint charging the defendant with collecting and receiving a greater rate than the maximum rate-allowed by the ordinance for gas furnished in the pipes laid in the streets for cooking, heating, and illuminating purposes. It is sufficient that the complaint charged a public offense, for collecting and receiving an excessive rate for illuminating purposes, within the jurisdiction of the recorder’s court.
Id.—Eight of City Unaffected by Use.—The right of the city to fix the rate for gas is unaffected by the use which is made of it. It covers all gas furnished through pipes laid in the street. [Per Beatty, C. J., and Van Dyke, J.; the majority of the court expressing no opinion.]
Id.—Construction of Constitution.—Section 19 of article XI of the constitution does not specifically include gas for heating or cooking; but under section 11 of article XI of the constitution the city has the proper public authority to make the regulations here in question. [Per Shaw, J.]
Opinion — Beatty
BEATTY, C. J.
These cases are in all respects like the case of the same title (S. F. No. 3801,
ante,
p. 629), just decided, except that in one of them the petitioner is charged with collecting the excessive rate for gas furnished for
cooking, heating,
and illuminating purposes.
Section 19 of article XI does not directly confer upon any individual or company the right to lay pipes and conduits in the streets of a city in order to supply gas for cooking and heating purposes, but only so far as may be necessary for supplying the city and its inhabitants with gaslight. The same gas, however, which furnishes light also serves for cooking and heating, and the pipes and connections necessary for the one purpose make the gas available for the other purposes, without subjecting the streets to any additional burden. It. was accordingly held in
Ex parte Johnston,
137 Cal. 122, that an intention to permit the use of gas for other than illuminating purposes afforded no ground for prohibiting the laying-of the pipes by a party claiming the benefit of the constitutional grant.
For the same reasons it must be held that the right of the-city to fix the rate for gas is unaffected by the use which is made of it. It covers all gas furnished through the pipes, laid in the street.
The judgments are affirmed.
Van Dyke, J., concurred.
Concurrence — Angellotti
[640]
ANGELLOTTI, J., concurring.
I concur in the judgments. The determination of the question as to whether the municipality had the right to fix a rate for gas furnished for cooking and heating purposes is not necessary to a decision of either case, and I therefore express no opinion thereon. The complaint against petitioner in the recorder’s court charged him with charging, collecting, and receiving the excessive rate for gas furnished to one Witman, not only for cooking and heating purposes, hut also for illuminating purposes.
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