Cobb v. Doggett
Before: Smith
Synopsis
action upon Judgment—Defense—Compromise with Assignees—Receipt of Local Attorney—Satisfaction of Judgment in Name of Plaintiff.—In an action by a judgment creditor to recover the unpaid balance of a judgment, in which the defendant pleaded as a defense, and the court found upon sufficient evidence, that the plaintiff had assigned the judgment to a partnership firm who had been his attorneys, and that a part of the judgment was paid to them in pursuance of an agreement of compromise with the assignees named, and in full settlement and satisfaction of the judgment, an objection that the settlement was not made directly with them, but with their local attorney, who was authorized to act for them, and whose acts were ratified by them, and who gave a receipt in full and a satisfaction of the judgment, as attorney for the plaintiff in the suit, is untenable. The use of the name of the nominal plaintiff in the suit was not improper.
Id.—Assignment of Judgment—Collateral Agreement as to Collection—Absence of Power of Compromise—Improper Exclusion of Evidence.—Where, besides the absolute assignment of the judgment, a contemporaneous written agreement was made between the assignor and assignees showing that the assignment was for collection, for a compensation of one half of the judgment, the assignor reserving the privilege of negotiating a compromise, the two instruments formed one contract between the parties; and though the effect of the assignment was to transfer the legal title and authorize the assignees to sue in their own name, yet under the contract they had no power to compromise the judgment to the extent of the interest reserved by the assignor. The court erred in excluding evidence of the collateral agreement, and should have admitted it and found accordingly, or directed an amendment.
Id.—Filing of Assignment without Collateral Agreement—Absence of Noíice—Defense not Pleaded—Leave to Amend upon Reversal.—Where it appears that only the assignment itself, which was absolute in form, was filed among the papers in the ease, and the collateral agreement was not filed, and there is no evidence tending to show that the defendant had notice of it, if the defense had been pleaded and sustained that the defendant dealt with the assignees, relying on the assignees alone, and without any notice of the collateral agreement, the exclusion of it would have become immaterial; but in the absence of such plea the judgment must be reversed for error in the ruling, with leave to the defendant to amend his answer, if so advised.
SMITH, C.
This is a suit to recover the balance alleged to be due on a judgment against defendant in favor of Max Gutter, of date October 15, 1894, for the sum of $1,041.90. Judgment was entered for the defendant, from which and from an order denying his motion for a new trial the plaintiff appeals.
The plaintiff is the assignee of Gutter, under an assignment of date October 20, 1894. It is not disputed that there was paid on the judgment by defendant, about February 5, 1895, or shortly afterwards, the sum of five hundred and eighty dollars, and that this was all that has been paid. But it is claimed by defendant, and found by the court, that prior to the payment, Gutter, by instrument in writing of date October 20, 1894, had assigned the judgment to Scrivner, Schell & Morgan, who had been his attorneys; and that the said amount so paid on judgment was paid in pursuance of an agreement of compromise with the assignees named and in full settlement and satisfaction thereof.
The latter finding is fully supported by the evidence. It is indeed objected that the settlement was not made directly with Scrivner, Schell & Morgan, but with one Holland, their local attorney; but the objection, we think, is untenable. Holland was authorized to act for them, and his acts were ratified by them in receiving the money paid, and the note and mortgage given to him in satisfaction of the judgment, which were afterwards satisfied by the defendant. Nor is it in any way material that Holland signed the receipt and the satisfaction of the judgment as “attorney for Max Gutter.” He was authorized by Scrivner, Schell & Morgan to act for them; and the use of the name of the nominal plaintiff in the suit was not improper. (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 385.)
With regard to the assignment to Scrivner, Schell & Morgan,
[144]
the finding is also supported by the evidence actually introduced, which was an instrument in writing, of the date named in the finding, in terms assigning the judgment to them. But it appears that, accompanying the assignment, there was a contemporaneous agreement in writing materially modifying its effect, which was offered in evidence by the plaintiff, but on the objection of the defendant excluded; and it is urged by the appellant that this ruling was erroneous.
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