Knight v. Martin
Before: Van Dyke
Synopsis
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Charles W. Cassin, and Garret W. McEnerney, for Appellant.
[246]
VAN DYKE, J.
This is
mandamus
on the part of the plaintiff to compel the defendant, county auditor of Santa Cruz county, to issue and deliver to him a warrant for the sum of one hundred and twenty-five dollars, the amount claimed as his salary as assistant district attorney of that county for the month of January, 1897. The court below gave judgment for the defendant, and discharged the alternative writ. The plaintiff appeals from sáid judgment on the judgment-roll. There was an issue of fact raised in reference to the order of the board of supervisors and the appointment thereunder, but the court finds in favor of the plaintiff on such issue: The appointment was made under subdivision
36
of section
25
of the County Government Act of 1893. Section
25
of the County Government Act enumerates the several powers conferred upon the boards of supervisors of the several counties in the state. Subdivision 36 of said section reads as follows: “To authorize the district attorney to appoint an assistant district attorney, which office is hereby created, who shall receive as compensation for his services the sum of fifteen hundred dollars per annum, to be paid out of the county treasury in equal monthly installments, in the same manner and at the same time other county officials are paid, unless otherwise in this act provided.” The district attorney of Santa Cruz county was elected at the general election in Kovember, 1894, and entered upon the duties of the officp in January, 1895. The order of the board of supervisors authorizing the district attorney to appoint an assistant district attorney was passed December 8, 1896. By section 61 of the County Government Act of 1893, county and township officers, except supervisors or judicial officers, are authorized to appoint as many deputies as may be necessary for the prompt and faithful discharge of the duties of their respective offices. By section
62
of the same act, whenever the official name of any principal officer is used, in conferring power or imposing duties or liabilities, it includes deputies. It is not questioned that an assistant district attorney is a deputy district attorney. At the time in question the county of Santa Cruz belonged to the fourteenth class in the classification of counties for purposes of compensation of officers under the direction of the constitution, and the salary of the district attorney of such county
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