City Council of San Jose v. Goodwin

SHENK, J.

This is an application on behalf of the City of San Jose for a writ of mandate to compel its city manager to include in his estimate of revenue and expenditures for the fiscal year commencing December 1, 1925, an amount based on a tax rate of $1.30.

At an election held on May 1, 1922, there was submitted to the electors of said city an ordinance providing that the maximum tax rate for the fiscal year commencing December 1, 1922, December 1, 1923, December 1, 1924, and December 1, 1925, should be fixed at $1.30. The proposed ordinance received a vote sufficient for its adoption if it was lawfully submitted at said election. The authority for the submission and adoption of such an ordinance is found in section 61 of the city charter, which provides: " The tax levy authorized by the council shall not exceed one dollar upon each one hundred dollars ($100.00) of the assessed valuation of all real and personal property within the city, exclusive of the amount necessary to pay the principal of and interest on the bonded indebtedness of the city, except by ordinance approved, or adopted by the affirmative vote of the majority of the people voting at a general or special election.” (Stats. 1915, p. 1891.) The ordinance in question was submitted and voted on at a first or primary election especially provided for in the charter. It is conceded that such a primary election is not a special election as contemplated by said section 61. The sole question for determination is whether the first or primary election at which the ordinance was submitted was a general election within the meaning of said section 61.

The tax levied by the city council must be based on the estimated revenue and expenditures included within a budget submitted by the city manager and he has refused to submit such a budget based on a tax rate of $1.30. His contention is

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that the said ordinance is invalid for the reason that it was not submitted to a vote of the people at a general or a special election as required by the charter. On behalf of the city it is contended that as the primary election under the charter is held at stated intervals, and that as all electors of the city were privileged to vote at said election on the question of the approval or rejection of said ordinance, the said primary election was to all intents and purposes a general election as contemplated by said section 61. An examination of other provisions of the charter must be resorted to in order to determine whether a primary election may be deemed á general election for the purpose of the submission of said ordinance.