In Re Estate of Bump
Before: Shaw
Synopsis
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
SHAW, J.
This is an appeal by the executors of the estate of Nelson Bump, deceased, and by the heirs and devisees of the deceased from an order allowing the widow of the deceased the sum of one hundred dollars a month out of the estate for her support during the pendency of the administration.
The fact that the widow may have had property of her own out of which she could have supported herself without -aid from the estate is immaterial.
(Estate of
Lux, 100 Cal. 593, 603, [35 Pac. 341].) A large part of the evidence appears to have been devoted to an attempt to prove this immaterial fact.
The contention is made that the provisions of sections 1464 to 1468, inclusive, of the Code of Civil Procedure, in so far as they authorize the making of orders setting apart exempt property and a homestead to the widow and for the payment of money t-o her out of the estate for her support, without notice to the heirs, devisees, or legatees, are in conflict with the fourteenth amendment of the constitution of the United States and with the state constitution, because they would operate to deprive such heirs, devisees, or legatees of their property without due process of law. The proposition is groundless. The making of such orders without notice is a part of the statutory proceeding for the administration of the estate, which is initiated by the giving of a general notice as prescribed in sections 1303, 1304 and 1373 of the Code of Civil Procedure. These notices constitute due process of law, and are sufficient to give the court jurisdiction to make all the subsequent orders in the proceeding, as to which special additional notice is not required. The right of inheritance and testamentary disposition is entirely the creation of the statute and the heirs, devisees, and legatees take the property subject to such burdens as the legislature has seen fit to impose upon it, among which is the burden of supporting the widow and children of the deceased whenever the court having jurisdiction of the administration of the estate shall make an order to that effect. The legislature had full power to provide that
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a part of the estate should thus be subject to the order of the probate court without notice, other than the general notice of the application for administration thereon. While it is true that the descent is cast and the property of the decedent vested in the devisees and legatees, or in the heirs, at the moment of the death of the deceased, it is also true that they take the property, subject to the payment of the expenses of administration and subject to the charges which the law fixes upon it for the support, maintenance, and comfort of the widow and family of the deceased and subject to the liability to have these charges enforced by orders of the court made without notice in pursuance of the statute.
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