La Grange Hydraulic Gold Mining Co. v. Carter

COOPER, C.

This action was brought to set aside and annul certain orders and entries raising the plaintiff’s assessments on certain properties for the year 1898. Findings were filed upon which judgmérit was entered in favor of defendants. This appeal is from the judgment and the order denying defendant’s motion for a new trial. The claim of appellant is, that the order made by the board of equalization was not sufficient in form, and was not in fact an order raising the plaintiff’s assessments.

Plaintiff, at the proper time, gave to the assessor a verified statement of its taxable property, and thereupon the assessor duly assessed plaintiff upon the propérty in controversy as follows:—

“James Ward Placer Mine, $19,700; Chaumont Quitry Ditch, $12,500; rights to waters of Stuart’s Fork, diverted by said Chaumont Quitry Ditch, $100.”

The board of equalization, at the time and in the manner provided by law, passed a resolution directing plaintiff to show cause on the thirteenth day of July, 1898, at the rooms of the board, why its assessment should not be raised as follows:—

“James Ward Placer Mine raised from $19,700 to $50,000; Chaumont Quitry Ditch, etc., from $12,500 to $22,500; rights to water of Stuart’s Fork, Chaumont Ditch, from $100 to $2,000.”

Due notice of the above resolution was given to plaintiff, and, at the time and place stated in the ‘notice, plaintiff ap

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peared before the board, with witnesses, who were examined as to the value of the property. The board had before it the assessment-roll containing the individual assessments in the county and other evidence, and after hearing the plaintiff a member of the board offered a resolution, as appears by the minutes, “that the assessment of the La Grange Hydraulic Gold Mining Company stand as raised.” The resolution was seconded and adopted by the board. It is claimed that there had been no raise of the plaintiff’s assessment, and that the above-quoted resolution was meaningless,, as it did not describe the property nor state the amount to which it was raised, nor state in fact that it was raised. There would be much force in the plaintiff’s contention if we were to look at the words of the resolution standing alone. But we must look at the context, other entries in the minutes, and to the testimony, in order to ascertain what was in fact done by the board. While it is the rule that tax proceedings^ and the levy and raising of assessments must be strictly construed, yet the rule should not be carried to the extent of looking solely to the record of an order made by an inferior tribunal or board. Such tribunal must possess the power claimed to have been exercised. It must have jurisdiction of the subject-matter ; it must have substantially followed the method prescribed by the statute; and finally, it must in fact have exercised the power. But, where all the above matters appear, the court will not go to the length of viewing the language used by such inferior board in a strictly technical sense. On the contrary, it will endeavor, by a view of the whole proceedings, to ascertain to a common certainty what was done.