Bemis v. Cookson (1911) · DecisionDepot

Bemis v. Cookson

Name: California Superior Court Tentative Rulings
Creator: DecisionDepot
License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/

California Supreme Court Sep 18, 1911 No. S.F. No. 5600.Published

Before: Angellotti

AI Brief

AI-generated · verify before citing

Holding. The court held that the trust provision distributing the income of a child who died without issue to the 'survivors' and 'the children of any deceased child by right of representation' refers only to the testator's children who were beneficiaries of the trust, excluding grandchildren whose parents died before the will was executed.

Issues

Whether the term 'any deceased child' in the trust clause includes children of the testator who died prior to the execution of the will.
Whether the phrase 'by right of representation' entitles grandchildren of the testator to share in the income of a trust established for the testator's surviving children.

Disposition. affirmed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“The trust provisions were obviously solely for the benefit of the three living children and their issue.”

Synopsis

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco. James M. Seawell, Judge.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

ANGELLOTTI, J.

This action was brought by Charles C. Bemis, as trustee of the trusts created by the last will of David R. Jones, deceased, against various persons claiming a portion of the income of the trust property, to compel said persons to interplead among themselves and procure a determination of their several claims. On stipulation of the parties, the trustee having deposited in court the amount in dispute, an order was made discharging him from all liability in regard thereto, and requiring the defendants to interplead among themselves with respect to their several claims. The plaintiffs in interpleader, Annie D. Cookson and Lily Butter-field, the other plaintiffs being their respective husbands, filed their complaint, claiming the whole of said money, and the defendants, in interpleader, Mabel Dodge Hamilton and Beatrice Jones, filed their answer, claiming all of the same. On motion, judgment on the pleadings was rendered in favor of the plain

[745]

tiffs in interpleader. This is an appeal from such judgment by said defendants.

The rights of the respective parties depend upon the construction to be given to clause 5 of a trust created by the will of David R. Jones, deceased, and declared by the decree of distribution in exactly the same language used in the will.

David R. Jones died testate on September 11, 1903, leaving surviving one son, John R. Jones, and two daughters, plaintiffs Annie D. Cookson and Lily Butterfield, and also two grandchildren, defendants Mabel Dodge Hamilton and Beatrice Jones, the former being the only child and lawful issue of Mary Jane Dodge, a daughter of deceased, and the latter being the only child and lawful issue of David H. Jones, a son of deceased, both of whom had died before deceased executed his last will. By his will, deceased gave to said Mabel Dodge Hamilton seventy-five thousand dollars, and to said Beatrice Jones seventy-five thousand dollars, which legacies were paid in full prior to distribution. He gave all the rest of his property to Charles C. Bemis in trust for the following purposes, viz.:

“1. To hold, invest, manage and control the same and to receive the income therefrom.

“2. To pay monthly to testator’s son, John R. Jones, during his natural life, one third of the net income derived from said trust estate.

Related research

proceeded to create a trust • for Ms surviving cMldren and their issue. As long as the tM'ee surviving children continued to live, no other person was permitted to enjoy any portion of the income of the trust property, hut the income of the same was to be paid, in one-third parts, to said three children. If any of said children died leaving issue, no one outside of said issue was to participate in his' or her share, which at once vested in such issue, free of the trust. Upon the death of any of such children without issue, the trust was not to terminate as to the share of the child so dying, but was to continue until the death of the last survivor, when, the purpose of the trust having been fully accomplished, such share was to go to the “heirs at law” of such deceased child. In the meantime, under clause 5, the income of such share was to be divided, share and share alike, among the survivors of said tMee children, and “the children of any deceased child by right of representation.” The bringing in under the pMase just quoted of the children of David H. Jones and Mary Jane Dodge, for whom specific provision had already been made, would appear to be foreign to the whole purpose of the trust scheme, and the language used is not reasonably susceptible of any construction that would include them. The only children of testator specifically mentioned in the provisions relating to the trust were the surviving children, John R. Jones, Lily Butterfield, and Annie D. Cookson, and the term “any deceased child” in clause 5, in the connection in wMch it was used, would naturally. be taken as referring only to such of the cMldren as were so named and for whose benefit primarily the trust was created. If it had been intended to include known children of cMldren already deceased in this income distribution, the natural thing would have been to specify them as intended to be so included. The term “any deceased child” in the connection in which it is used would reasonably appear to refer only to children living at the time of the execution of the will.

AI Brief

Synopsis

ANGELLOTTI, J.

More from California Supreme Court

Related research

AI Brief