Cal. Grape Control Bd., Ltd. v. Boothe Fruit Co.

PRESTON, J.

The plaintiff, a co-operative marketing corporation, organized under the laws of California for the purpose of securing the benefits of the Federal Agricultural Marketing Act, caused to be grouped together in the year 1930, a large percentage of the grape acreage of California, by securing the signatures of the owners of such acreage to a uniform marketing agreement constituting it their selling agent. One Swanson, a signatory to such uniform agreement, had a grape yield on his acreage in Stanislaus County,

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for the year 1930, of about 100 tons. In September, 1930, through his agent, one Paulson, he sold the said grapes on the vines to plaintiff. A down payment on the purchase price was made and conspicuous notices of purchase were posted throughout the vineyard. Later, payments were completed to Swanson himself. The authority of the agent to sell was put in issue by defendant in this áction, but the question of want of authority of said agent, if such defense were sustained, would be immaterial as the sale was specially ratified by the owner who, as above noted, personally received, without protest, the balance of the purchase price and, moreover, expressly approved the contract of sale after it was made by the agent.

The Boothe Company, a corporation (defendant here), had as its president and manager D. P. Boothe, who resented the policy, purposes and operations of plaintiff. Admittedly with full knowledge of the claims of ownership of plaintiff to said vineyard, said corporation, through its president, entered upon the lands of said Swanson and picked some 47 tons of said grapes, carried them away and converted them into raisins, which were marketed for its own benefit. Plaintiff’s complaint here against said Boothe Company as defendant was cast in three counts. First, it sought an injunction against further depredations upon said vineyard by defendant; second, it stated a cause of action for claim and delivery and, third, it contained a plain count for conversion of personal property. It further alleged that the act of defendant was prompted and executed by fraud, malice and oppression and prayed for exemplary damages. The answer of defendant was a general and special denial. The case was tried upon the conversion count alone, the other two counts apparently being abandoned by plaintiff. The court made findings for plaintiff upon said count, fixing the value of the property converted at $387 and assessing exemplary damages against defendant in the sum of $100. Defendant appealed. We can find no merit in the grounds urged for reversal.