In Re Estate of Heberle
Before: THE COURT.
Synopsis
Will—Void Trust—Intestacy.—Where a trust attempted to be created by a will is void, if there are no other apt words in the will disposing of the property affected thereby, intestacy as to it is the result.
Id.—Construction in Favor op Testacy.—A construction of a will which favors testacy is always preferred to one resulting in intestacy. Id.—“Distributed”—Meaning op.—The word “distributed” is not a technical word is conveyancing and is not usually found in deeds. If it has any legal technical meaning it has such meaning with reference to decrees of distribution in probate courts.
Id.—Disposition op Property Appected by Void Trust.—Where a trust attempted to be created by a will in specified real estate is void, further provisions of the will, to the effect that in the event of the testator’s disposing of such property, his trustees should pay the proceeds thereof to the beneficiaries of the trust, and, if not so sold, the property “is to be kept and distributed to” such beneficiaries, evince an intention on the part of the testator that such property or its proceeds should, either with or without a trust, pass to the persons designated as beneficiaries.
THE COURT.
This is an appeal from an order sustaining, without leave to amend, demurrers to the petition of Jacob Heberle and Eva Dickhof for partial distribution to them, as heirs at law, of a portion of the estate of George Heberle, deceased, it being the contention of petitioners that as to this portion he died intestate. The petitioners’
status
as
[276]
heirs at law is not in question. The only question is whether or not from a construction of the will of deceased intestacy resulted as to the property in controversy.
The deceased by his will, after directing the payment of his debts and funeral expenses, devised and bequeathed to trustees all the rest and residue of his estate upon specified trusts. By the seventh paragraph of his will he directed certain real property upon Spring Street in the city of Los Angeles, called for convenience the Spring Street property, of the estimated value of sixty-five thousand dollars, to be held by the trustees for the term of five years “and then the same by said trustees to be conveyed to the children of my deceased brother Martin Heberle, late of Miamisburg, Montgomery County, state of Ohio, share and share alike.” It is conceded by all parties to this litigation that this trust is void.
(Estate of Walkerly,
108 Cal. 628, [49 Am. St. Rep. 97, [41 Pac.
772] ; Estate of Cavarly,
119 Cal. 408, [51 Pac. 629] ;
Estate of Fair,
132 Cal. 523, [84 Am. St. Rep. 70, 60 Pac. 442, 64 Pac. 1000] ;
Estate of Dixon,
143 Cal. 511, [77 Pac. 412] ;
Estate of Sanford,
136 Cal. 97, [68 Pac. 494].) At the time of his death the testator still owned the Spring Street property. The question to be answered is what disposition is to be made of it. Admittedly, if intestacy results as to this property, the petitioners are entitled to share in it.
More from California Supreme Court
- People v. Wende (1979)
- People v. Watson (1956)
- People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996)
- People v. Kelly (2006)
- Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962)
- Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001)
- People v. Lewis (2021)
- In Re Estrada (1965)
- Denham v. Superior Court (1970)
- People v. Marsden (1970)