In Re Rosencrantz

California Supreme Court Mar 17, 1931 No. Docket No. Crim. 3414.Published

Before: Langdon

AI Brief

AI-generated · verify before citing

Holding. The court held that a prior offense where probation was granted without a judgment of conviction does not constitute a felony conviction under the habitual offender statute, rendering the life sentence improper, but denied the writ because the petitioner had not yet served the maximum lawful sentence for her current conviction.

Issues

Whether Penal Code section 476a is unconstitutional for granting sentencing discretion to trial judges.
Whether a prior offense where probation was granted without a judgment of conviction constitutes a felony under Penal Code section 644.
Whether a prisoner may be granted a writ of habeas corpus for an excessive sentence before the expiration of the time for which they may be lawfully confined.

Disposition. writ discharged

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“There being no conviction, there is nothing to bring this first case within the provisions of section 644.”

“It is the established practice of the Supreme Court not to consider any question of excess of sentence until the expiration of the time for which the prisoner may be lawfully confined.”

LANGDON, J.

This is a petition for a writ of

habeas corpus.

Petitioner was tried in the Superior Court of Alameda County and convicted of a violation of section 476a of the Penal Code. The information filed against her also charged the prior conviction of three separate felonies. Petitioner admitted the second and third, but denied the alleged first prior conviction. A finding against her was made on this issue, and she was thereupon sentenced to life imprisonment without eligibility for parole, under the provisions of section 644 of the Penal Code.

Petitioner has heretofore made application for writs of

habeas corpus

to this court, as well as to the Superior Court of Marin County and to the District Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, all of which applications were denied. It is urged, however, that the grounds for the present petition are raised here for the first time, and accordingly we have examined them with great care.

The contention is made that section 476a of the Penal Code is unconstitutional in that by reason of the discretion which it gives to the trial judge to sentence the convicted offender either to the state prison or the county jail, it is discriminatory in operation, and constitutes a denial

[751]

of equal protection of the laws. The legislative practice of vesting in trial courts or juries discretion in fixing punishments, within certain limits, is quite general, and not new. Since every person charged with the offense has the same chance for leniency as well as the same possibility of receiving the maximum sentence, there is nothing discriminatory in the statute.

The main point urged in the petition is that the judgment and commitment under section 644 of the Penal Code was improper because, it is contended, petitioner had not previously been convicted of

three prior felonies.

It is asserted that the alleged first conviction never occurred. The record shows that she was charged on January 12, 1920, in the county of San Diego, with violation of the same statute as in her later convictions. She pleaded guilty and was granted probation for a period of two years. No judgment of conviction was pronounced by the court. The question is whether this constitutes the

In Re Rosencrantz

AI Brief

LANGDON, J.

More from California Supreme Court

Related research

AI Brief