Lindley v. Knowlton
Before: Melvin
Synopsis
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
MELVIN, J.
O. P. Bindley and his wife, Lillian S. Bindley, sued defendant for damages on account of personal injuries, alleged to have been sustained by Mrs. Bindley because of fright occasioned by the appearance and acts of a chimpanzee owned by Knowlton. The complaint contained allegations that the animal was so negligently kept by defendant that it escaped from restraint and entered the dwelling-house of plaintiffs, where Mrs. Bindley and her two little children were at the time; that it attacked the* two children successively, choking one of them severely; that the mother successfully, though with great effort, contended with the chimpanzee, rescuing her children from it, although the beast weighed about 165 pounds; and that in consequence of the said animal entering the house and seizing the children Mrs. Bindley was greatly frightened, shocked, and made sick in body and mind. It was averred that as a consequence her nervous system was disordered; she was rendered hysterical and caused to suffer pain and mental anguish; and that she was confined to her bed for many months as a result of the permanent injuries to her physical health and mind and nervous system. The proof offered tended to sustain these allegations. A verdict was given in favor of plaintiffs for two thousand dollars; judgment was entered accordingly, and defendant appeals from said judgment.
Appellant contends that the court erred in refusing to give certain instructions involving the following propositions: (1) No recovery may be had unless the fright occasioned by defendant was accompanied by some personal and bodily injury; (2) The injury must be a physiological one; and (3) No recovery may be had on account of fright produced by apprehended danger or peril to a third person.
The court did tell the jurors that no verdict might be given for plaintiffs unless Mrs. Bindley received injuries which were the natural consequences of fright caused as. alleged in the complaint. They were told that unless the evidence showed, by a preponderance thereof, that the occurrence recited in the complaint had taken place and was “the efficient, proximate, and producing cause of the injuries complained
[300]
of or of the conditions of ill health, if any, on the part of the plaintiff, Lillian S. Lindley, or some of said conditions or. injuries,” their verdict, must be for,the defendant. Another instruction was to the effect that they might consider Mrs. Lindley’s previous physical condition in determining whether the results of which she complained were or were not the consequences of general ill health. The instructions were full and fair, and the refusal to give those offered by defendant was not error.
More from California Supreme Court
- People v. Wende (1979)
- People v. Watson (1956)
- People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996)
- People v. Kelly (2006)
- Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962)
- Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001)
- People v. Lewis (2021)
- In Re Estrada (1965)
- Denham v. Superior Court (1970)
- People v. Marsden (1970)