Weeks v. Superior Court

WASTE, J.

The petitioner seeks a writ of mandate to

compel the respondent to grant her a final decree of divorce. Her application here is based upon the refusal of the superior court to act, for the reason that the petitioner, as a party to the divorce action, has willfully disobeyed the lawful order óf the court relating to the custody of a child of the marriage, and is, therefore, in contempt of court.

The petitioner is the defendant in an action for divorce brought against her by her husband on the ground of extreme cruelty. When the action came on for trial she was represented in court by counsel, and she and the minor child of the marriage were in the state and within the jurisdiction of the superior court. By the terms of the interlocutory decree the court determined that the husband was entitled to a divorce, and awarded him the custody and control of the minor. On the day of the trial, and after the decree was granted, the petitioner, without the consent or permission of the court or of the plaintiff in the action, removed the minor from the state, where she has. kept the child ever since. When one year expired after the entry of the interlocutory judgment, the petitioner, without coming into the state, applied to the respondent, through an attorney, for the entry of a final judgment. granting the divorce. Her application was opposed by the plaintiff in the action on the facts stated, and upon the ground that petitioner is in contempt of court in keeping the minor outside the jurisdiction of the superior

[622]

court to prevent him from gaining possession of the child in accordance with the court’s decree. Petitioner made no attempt to controvert these facts or the allegation as to her motive.

[1]

We think the respondent was right in refusing to enter the final decree of divorce.

[2]

Section 132 of the Civil Code provides that when one year has expired after the entry of the interlocutory decree the court, on motion of either party, or upon its own motion, may enter the final judgment granting the divorce. But that does not mean that a party to the action may have a final decree entered when to do so would be a flagrant abuse of the principles of equity and of the due administration of justice. It is within contemplation of the section that facts arising subsequently to the granting of the interlocutory judgment should have their influence in determining the right to a final decree. (O