Ellis v. Jefferds
Before: Smith
Synopsis
Public Officer—Supervisor’s Salary—County of Eleventh Class— County Government Acts of 1893 and 1897.—A supervisor of a county of the eleventh class, who was elected under the County Government Act of 1893, under which his salary was fixed at the sum of eighteen hundred dollars per annum, and who was in office at the time of the enactment of the County Government Act of 1897, under which his county became one of the thirteenth class and by which the salary of supervisors was fixed at one thousand dollars per annum, continues to be entitled, under section 233 of the latter act, to the salary provided by the act of 1893; and the fact that since the passage of the latter act he had received warrants only for the amount of the salary therein provided, upon the refusal of the auditor to Issue them for the amount provided by the act of 1893, does not estop him from demanding the balance,
SMITH, C.
The case is an application for a writ of
mandamus
to the auditor of Tulare county, requiring him to issue to the plaintiff a warrant for the sum of eleven hundred and thirty-three and one-third dollars, the balance due on account of salary as supervisor and road commissioner for the period commencing with the first Monday in June, 1897, and ending with the first Monday in FTovemh'er, 1898.
The plaintiff was elected under the County Government Act of 1893; under which, as supervisor of a county of the eleventh class, his salary was fixed at the sum of eighteen hundred dollars per annum. (Stats. 1893, sec. 173, p. 416.) But pending
[479]
his term the County Government Act of 1897 was enacted, under which Tulare became a county of the thirteenth class, and th'e salary for supervisors was fixed at one thousand dollars per annum. (Stats. 1897, sec. 170, p. 522.) The case— in the view I take of it—turns upon two questions, namely: Do the provisions of the latter act as to salary apply to the plaintiffs case? If not, is he estopped by his receipt of part of what was due him from demanding the balance?
1. With regard to the latter question the court in effect found that plaintiff received his warrants under an agreement with the defendant that the same were not in full settlement of plaintiff’s salary, but on account, etc. It is claimed that the evidence is insufficient to justify this finding; but the question I regard as immaterial. The plaintiff repeatedly demanded warrants for the full amounts due him, and the defendant refused to issue warrants for greater amounts than eighty-three and oné-third dollars. It was the duty of the auditor to draw his warrant for the amount due the plaintiff, and, if he was entitled to the salary prescribed by the act of 1893, the issue of warrants by the auditor for part of what was due was only a partial performance of his duty, and did not exonerate him from further obedience to the law. The agreement or understanding of the parties, as to whether the payment was in full'or on account, was altogether immaterial. A somewhat similar question is decided in
Whiting v. Plumas Co.,
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