People v. Zeigler
Before: McFarland, Beatty
Synopsis
Criminal Law—Homicide—Insanity—Evidence—Condition or Dependant at Time op Trial.—In determining whether, at the time of the commission of a homicide, the defendant was insane, the juiy may consider his acts, conduct, and appearance prior to and after that time, and evidence of his insanity at the time of trial may be considered.
Id.—Instruction not Ground por Reversal.—Where the evidence of defendant on the subject of insanity at the time of the homicide was not specially directed to his state of mind at the time of the trial, and no instruction was asked as to evidence relating to that question, an instruction which, under several decisions of this court, is to be construed as relating to the question whether or not the defendant was in a proper condition as to present sanity or insanity to be put on his trial for the main offense, and that he was to be considered as sane for the purposes of the trial, and was to De presumed sane at the time of the homicide, and that the burden of proving his insanity at that time was upon the defendant, though not to be commended as a whole, is not ground for reversal. [Beatty, C. J., dissenting.]
Opinion — McFARLAND
McFARLAND, J.
Defendant was convicted of the crime of murder in the first degree and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death. He appeals from the judgment and from an order denying his motion for a- new trial.
The sole defense of appellant was insanity. The only point in the case which seems to call for a discussion is raised by appellant’s objection and exception to the thirteenth instruction given by the court at the request of the prosecution,
[338]
which, is as follows: “You are not to consider whether or not the defendant is insane at the present time, but you are to consider him as now sane. A person charged with crime cannot be legally tried for such crime, unless he be sane at the time of the trial. The defendant has presented the issue to you that, at the very time of the alleged commission of the homicide, he was insane. As I have already told you, the burden of proving his insanity at that time by a preponderance of evidence rests upon him, because the law presumes he was then sane.” If this instruction must be construed as telling the jury that in determining whether or not the appellant was insane at the time of the commission of the alleged crime they could not consider any evidence tending to sh'ow that he was insane at the time of the trial, it is erroneous. It is the well-established rule that in determining whether at a certain date a person was insane, a jury may consider his acts, conduct, appearance, etc., prior to and after the said date, and that, if he is on trial for a crime alleged to have been committed at such date, evidence of his insanity at the time of his trial may be considered. (1 Greenleaf on Evidence, sec. 42;
People
v.
Farrell,
31 Cal. 576;
Estate of Toomes,
54 Cal. 516;
1
People
v.
Lee Fook,
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