Hogan v. Bigler

COOPER, P. J.

Plaintiffs recovered judgment, foreclosing a materialman’s lien on the premises described in the complaint, belonging to defendant Louisa Bigler.

It is required by the code (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 1187) that the claim or notice of lien filed by one claiming to have furnished materials which were used in the building or structure, shall state, among other things, “the name of the person to whom he furnished the materials.” In this ease the claim of lien stated that the lumber was sold and furnished to J. J. Crawford, and the complaint so alleges. The evidence shows without conflict that the lumber was sold to Fred Hambleton, and the court finds that the lumber was sold, fur

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nished and delivered to “E. 0. Wood, P. Hambleton and C. M. Cook.” The notice of lien, therefore, did not comply with the plain mandate of the statute. Plaintiffs sold the lumber directly to Hambleton—that is, Hambleton was the party who went to them and ordered the lumber. They knew him, and no matter what he stated as to the party for whom he was purchasing the lumber, they could easily have complied with the law by stating the fact in their claim of lien as to whom the lumber was furnished. The courts have uniformly held that the party who desires to avail himself of the provisions of the mechanic’s lien law so as to charge the land or building of a third party with a debt incurred by another and not by the owner, must comply substantially with the statutory requirements as to making out in writing and verifying his claim of lien. We have no power to dispense with the plain requirements of the statute. The legislature saw fit to require that the claim should state the name of the person to whom the materials were furnished. The claim in this case does not do so; hence it cannot be the basis for the enforcement of a lien on the land of the defendant Louisa Bigler.

In

Madera Flume Co.

v.

Kendall,

120 Cal. 182, [65 Am. St. Rep. 177, 52 Pac. 304], the notice of lien did not state the name of the person to whom the plaintiff furnished the materials, and it was held insufficient. The court said, after quoting the statement in the claim of lien: “In this statement the plaintiff does not state that it furnished any of these materials to William Price; nor does it state the name of the person to whom it did furnish them. Not only does the statement fail to name the person to whom the materials were furnished by the plaintiff, but it is- consistent with their having been furnished by it to someone other than Price, • for whom he obtained them in fulfillment of his contract with Kendall.”