Mason v. Superior Court

SHAW, J.

Upon application of petitioner, an alternative writ of mandate was heretofore issued, directed to the

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Honorable Charles Monroe, judge of the superior court of Los Angeles County, department thirteen thereof, commanding him to proceed with the trial of a certain case, entitled, John B. Mason

v.

Mamie Wallick Neilly, also known as Mamie Wallick Mason, then pending therein, or show cause at a time and place specified why he should not so proceed.

It appears from the petition that petitioner, as plaintiff, commenced an action in said court the purpose of which was to obtain a decree for the annulment of the marriage of himself and the defendant named in said action. Due service was had Upon defendant, who made default therein; whereupon the ease was set for trial in said department thirteen of said superior court on March 12, 1914, at which time it was called for trial, and plaintiff by his attorneys, after paying the fees of the reporter and complying with all rules prevailing in said court, proceeded with the trial of the case, when, after certain proceedings had and testimony taken, said court did, as alleged, “arbitrarily and without any reason whatsoever, stop the said trial, refuse to hear any other or further testimony or to proceed in any other respect with the said trial, or to grant or deny a decree, or to take the matter under consideration, or to dismiss the said cause, or to nonsuit the plaintiff, or to take any step whatsoever in relation thereto, except to so refuse to further proceed”; all of which the return to the court admits, with the qualification, however, that at said time the court continued the further hearing of the case to the thirteenth day of October, 1914; the reason assigned for so doing being, as appears from a transcript of the testimony taken in said matter, though no answer was filed, that plaintiff in said action had theretofore, on October 9, 1913, obtained an interlocutory decree of divorce from the defendant in said action. The learned judge, as appears from this transcript, was of the opinion that plaintiff was desirous of marrying again. In speaking of the decree of divorce, the judge stated: “He (plaintiff) got what he asked for. Now what does he want to do, marry right away!” And when plaintiff’s attorney suggested that since it had been discovered that defendant was not capable of contracting the marriage (a fact not known to petitioner when the decree of divorce was granted), plaintiff was entitled to an annulment thereof, notwithstand