Hall v. Crowley

COOPER, P. J.

Plaintiff recovered judgment in ejectment for possession of the lot and premises described in the complaint. This appeal is from the judgment on the judgment-roll with a bill of exceptions.

Plaintiff’s title was derived as follows: In April, 1904, Daniel Crowley and his son, Jeremiah Crowley, being the owners of said lot, executed, acknowledged and delivered a deed of trust to P. W. Bridge and A. P. Bridge, as parties of the second part, and one H. S. Bridge, as party of the third part, to secure the payment of a promissory note made by the Crowleys to said H. S. Bridge. The note was not paid, and the parties of the second part named in the deed of trust, after default in the payment, and under and in pursuance of the power of sale contained in the deed, and upon due and proper notice, sold the lot to one Carrie E. Bridge, and executed and delivered to her a deed to the said premises. Carrie E. Bridge afterward sold and conveyed to plaintiff. It is therefore evident that the plaintiff was the owner and entitled to the possession of the lot, unless there was some fatal defect in some of the proceedings through which the title passed from the Crowleys to him. We will briefly examine the alleged• assignments of error made by appellant’s counsel.

He attacks the following finding: “That thereafter, after proceeding had and taken, and as stipulated by counsel in the trial of said case, whatever title was conveyed by said deed of trust became duly vested in plaintiff by the trustee’s deed, duly delivered in accordance with the said deed of trust.” The quoted finding is only a detached sentence taken from the findings, which cover some ten folios, and it is discussed without any regard to its context. It is stated that there is no evidence that counsel ever entered into the stipulation referred to in the finding; but conceding no such stipulation was made the reference to the stipulation may be regarded as surplusage if the other findings and the remaining portion of the finding quoted show that the title con

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veyed by the deed of trust passed, through intermediate conveyances, to and finally vested in the plaintiff. It is, however, contended (and this seems to be the appellant’s main contention) that the sale was void for the reason that it was made by F. W. Bridge and A. F. Bridge instead of “H. S. Bridge, Trustee.”