Title Insurance and Trust Co. v. Lusk
Before: Allen
Synopsis
Street Improvement Begun Under Act of 1903—Continuance Under Act of 1909—Bight of Abandonment—Entry of Interlocutory Judgment.—Although a street improvement was begun in 1907 under the act of 1903, which authorized, the city council to abandon the proceeding at any time before payment of the compensation awarded to the defendants, yet where it was pending at the time of the act of 1909, which required its continuance thereunder, an abandonment thereafter by the city council was expressly limited by that act to the time of the entry of the interlocutory judgment in favor of the several defendants for the sums determined as damages for the taking of the lands.
Ib.—Constitutional Change of Pending Proceeding—Limitation of Abandonment—Change of Remedy.—The provision of section 11 of the act of 1909 that proceedings for a street improvement pending at the time of the passage of that act shall be continued under the provisions of that act is not violative of the constitutional inhibition against vested rights because of the limitation of the right of abandonment under that act, as it only affects the remedy of abandonment as distinguished from the right.
Id.—Power of Legislature to Change Remedies.—Remedies must always be under the control of the legislature; and where a reasonable remedy is provided, it is immaterial that it alters one previously existing.
Id.—Remedy not Unreasonably Impaired—City not in Position to Object.—The city is not in a position to object that the remedy of abandonment was unreasonably impaired, since the record shows that nearly nine months elapsed between the passage of the act of 1909 and the entry of the interlocutory judgment, during which time it had notice of the limitation upon the remedy of abandonment and dismissal imposed by section 14 of that act; and the remedy cannot be said to be unreasonably impaired.
Id.—Refusal of City Council to Proceed With Objections to Assessment—Claim of Further Right to Abandon—Mandamus.— Where the city council, after the interlocutory judgment, refused to proceed with the hearing of objections to the assessment of damages, under an unwarranted claim of a further right to abandon the proceedings, mandamus will lie to compel the city council to perform the official duty, as required in section 19 of the street law of 1909, to pass upon and determine the questions involved in the protests against the assessment, and either to confirm and modify the assessment or to order a new assessment.
Id.—Proper Remedy by Writ of Mandate—Absence of Adequate Remedy.—Under section 1085 of the Code of Civil Procedure a writ of mandate may be issued to compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, where there is, as in this case, no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy open to the petitioners for the writ.
ALLEN, P. J.
It appears from the petition and affidavit filed that heretofore, in 1907, under the provisions of the
[360]
street improvement act of 1903 [Stats. 1903, c. 268], the city council of Los Angeles duly adopted an ordinance declaring its intention to order the widening of Eighth street, between Main street and Central avenue; said ordinance further designated the land necessary and convenient to be taken for such improvement, and fixed the boundaries of the assessment district, within which was included the property benefited by such improvement; that this ordinance was approved and published, and was followed by a subsequent ordinance ordering the improvement to be made and directing the city attorney to bring an action in the name of the city of Los Angeles for the condemnation of the property described in said ordinance necessary to be taken for the improvement mentioned. The action was instituted by said city attorney on July 3, 1907, against those whose lands were to be taken for such improvement. It is not shown at what date the trial was had or verdict returned, but it does appear that on January 3, 1910, an interlocutory judgment was entered in favor of the several defendants for the sums determined as damages which should be awarded the various defendants by reason of the taking of the land for the contemplated improvement. It will be presumed, in view of section 6 of the street law, to the effect that actions for the condemnation of property brought thereunder shall in all respects be subject to and governed by such provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure now existing or that may hereafter be adopted, as may be applicable thereto, except in the particulars otherwise provided for in this act, that the judgment was entered by the clerk within twenty-four hours after the rendition of the verdict, as provided by section 664 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It further appears that after' the entry of said interlocutory judgment, to wit, on the twenty-ninth day of July, 1910, a diagram of said improve ment and of the property within the assessment district de-! scribed in the ordinance, with the assessment, were filed with the clerk of the city council of the city of Los Angeles; that thereafter protests were filed against such assessment on the ground that the same was inequitable; that upon the hearing of such protests, to wit, on the fifteenth day of November, 1910, the same were sustained by the city council, but that the city council have ever since failed and refused, and now fail and refuse, to either confirm, modify, or correct said assess
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