People v. Thomas
Before: Prewett
Synopsis
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
PREWETT, J., pro tem.
The appellant was convicted of the crime of manslaughter committed in the city of Sacramento on the evening of December 21, 1921. It is charged in the information that he “willfully, unlawfully and feloniously” committed the act.
[1]
The appellant insists that, as the offense was feloniously committed, it must therefore have been malicious. Since manslaughter is an unlawful killing without malice, he argues that the information does not charge that offense. But manslaughter is clearly a felony, and to charge that the crime was “felonious” is no more than to charge that it constituted manslaughter. One of the approved definitions of the word “felonious” is given by Merriam’s Webster as follows: “Felonious—Of, or pertaining to or having the quality of felony.”
In the ordinary information for murder, the crime is charged as committed “feloniously, and with premeditation and malice aforethought.” It is universally held that an information so charging will justify a conviction of the crime of manslaughter. This is based on the assumption that the lesser crime is included within the greater. In this case we have an information which clearly charges all the elements of manslaughter; and the appellant insists that it charges even more. So far as it exceeds the necessary requirements for manslaughter, it merely charges, to that extent, the acts necessary to constitute the crime of murder. If, therefore, an information that charges the
[310]
offense as committed with malice aforethought will sustain a conviction of manslaughter, it follows that an information which charges all the elements of manslaughter and at least some of the elements of murder, will support a conviction of the lesser crime. It is held in
People
v.
Pearne,
118 Cal. 155 [50 Pac. 376], that the addition of more elements in charging the crime makes it none the less a crime.
Moreover, if a more strict interpretation of the word “felonious” could be justified, it is sufficient to say that the appellant was not misled by the use of the word and that section
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