People v. Stelling

SPENCE, J.

Defendant was charged with a violation of chapter 638 of the Statutes of 1931, said act being referred to by the parties as either the Motor Carriers’ Transportation Act or the Motor Carriers Transportation Agents’ Act. Defendant was duly tried and convicted and he appeals from the judgment of conviction and the order denying his motion for ■ a new trial.

Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient in several respects, but we find no merit in these contentions. It is first claimed that the evidence failed to show that appellant “sold or offered for sale the alleged transportation”. It appears, however, that appellant was operating an establishment at 768 Howard Street in San Francisco, where signs were displayed advertising fares to various points; that two officers in civilian clothes entered the place and asked appellant “if this was the place to buy transportation to Los Angeles” and appellant “said it was”; that

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appellant advised the officers that the fare would be $6 apiece; that the officers each offered to pay $6, but appellant stated. that $1 should be paid to him by each of them “for the reservations’’ and that each “should give the $5.00 additional to the driver”. There was a conflict in the evidence, appellant testifying that the officers did not offer to pay $6, that they did not pay $2 for reservations, but that they merely paid him 25 cents each for insurance policies which he delivered to them. Nevertheless, the evidence of the officers showed that appellant accepted money for the express purpose of making reservations for the transportation of said officers. In our opinion the evidence was sufficient to show that appellant was holding himself out as a motor carrier transportation agent and that he offered for sale and negotiated for transportation as such agent within the meaning of said act. Appellant also claims that the evidence failed to show “that the portion of the highway over which the alleged transportation occurred was served by any certified carriers”. In support of this claim appellant attempts to put an unwarranted interpretation upon the testimony of Mr. Williams, an assistant engineer connected with the Railroad Commission, who testified that the route over which the officers were transported was “served by carriers certified by the railroad commission of the state of California”. Appellant also claims that ‘‘ It does not appear that the carrier for whom appellant sold transportation did not have a certificate of public convenience.” The prosecution introduced evidence to show that Thompson, the driver of the automobile in which the officers were transported, was in appellant’s place of business when the officers paid appellant for their reservations. One of the officers asked appellant what kind of a machine he would be transported in, and Thompson spoke up and said, “You are going down in a seven-passenger Studebaker.” It was apparently the theory of the prosecution that appellant himself might have been the carrier operating the Studebaker car, using Thompson as the driver. Testimony was therefore introduced to show that appellant had no certificate of public convenience and necessity. Appellant took the stand and denied most of the rbaterial evidence given by the officers regarding the transaction, denied any connection