Lisle v. E. B. & A. L. Stone Co.

THE COURT.

The above action was for the recovery of a commission for the sale of certain property which plaintiff alleged was effected by her as a broker. This allegation was denied and the case was tried by the court without a jury. Judgment was ordered for defendant corporation and, findings having been waived, was entered accordingly.

The plaintiff, who has appealed, contends that the judgment is not supported by the evidence and that the defendant was shown to have been guilty of bad faith in the transaction.

Plaintiff’s-authority was evidenced by certain letters from the defendant corporation agreeing to pay her a commission for the sale of the property which consisted of several parcels of land in the city of Oakland. The authority to sell was exclusive for certain periods limited by the letters, which also specified the prices asked for the several parcels. By the terms of her contract plaintiff’s authority expired on July 5, 1927, and the evidence shows that in August, 1927, a sale of the property was made by the defendants to the city of Oakland. The city was represented in the transaction by its port commission. According to the president

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of that body, the plaintiff appeared before the commission at different times, but on no occasion did she offer the property at a definite price or fix a price for any of the parcels. According to this witness, the prices mentioned by her varied from time to time until finally the members of the commission, who knew the owner of the property and were familiar with it before they were approached by plaintiff, refused to negotiate further with her. The commission subsequently opened negotiations with the defendant, which led to the purchase of the properly by the city.

The above, with the testimony of an officer of the corporation that the plaintiff on July 4, 1927, requested a further extension of her contract, supports the implied conclusion of the trial court that her efforts to effect a sale were fruitless; and where, as here, her conduct was such as to reasonably justify the commission in refusing further negotiations with her, the further conclusion that she was not the procuring cause of the sale subsequently made was warranted by the evidence.