White v. Reskin

VALENTINE, J.,

pro

tem.

This was an action for broker’s commission on sale of real estate. The case was tried upon a stipulated statement of facts, and no other evidence was introduced. Judgment was rendered for plaintiff, from which judgment the defendant appeals. Further facts are stated in the opinion.

Appellant first contends that Evans, the agent (plaintiff’s assignor), did not produce a purchaser ready and willing to purchase the property described in the agency contract, nor upon the terms therein set forth, because no location is given for the property nor is the city and county mentioned in the agency contract. The agency contract describes the property as being “situate in the county of L. A., State of Calif., to wit—North half of lots 60, 70, 71, 72, 73 La Tresa Riverside B’lvd.”

[515]

Assuming that a deficiency or variance from the description and terms in the escrow may have existed in the agency contract as claimed by appellant, nevertheless the agreed statement of facts upon which the case was tried and decided contains this stipulation: “That both defendant and plaintiff’s assignor intended, in said agent’s contract to describe the same property described on page 1 of this stipulation,” which description is as follows: “Lots 70, 71, 72, 73 and the north half of lot 60 of La Tresa tract as per map recorded in Book 6, page 54 of Maps, Beeords of Los Angeles County,” which is an adequate description of the property in question, and cured any deficiency or variance in the original.

(Anderson

v.

Wilstrup,

34 Cal. App. 771 [168 Pac. 1150];

Cowing

v.

Wofford,

68 Cal. App. 538, 544 [229 Pac. 883].)

It also appears from the stipulated facts that prior to May 14, 1923, the date of the escrow instructions, the said agent Evans took the prospective purchaser Mary B. Snyder upon the said property and exhibited the same to her on two occasions, and as to the terms it appears from the stipulated facts that said agent received from said Mrs. Snyder personally her check for $1,000 as a deposit on the purchase price and then brought Mrs. Snyder’s agent, a Mr. Tufts, and the appellant together at the office of the Title Insurance & Trust Company, where escrow instructions were signed by appellant as seller and by said Tufts as her agent for and on behalf of Mrs. Snyder as buyer, which instructions clearly stated the terms and the correct description. The $1,000 was deposited in escrow when the same was opened with instructions to place the same to the account of Mary B. Snyder to be used in accordance with her instructions when the title company could issue its guarantee in its usual form, and it was stipulated in said agreed statement of facts “that said prospective purchaser Mary B. Snyder was at all times financially able to purchase said property