In Re Kling

SHAW, J.

A proceeding for the disbarment of appellant as an attorney at law was instituted in the superior court by the Los Angeles Bar Association. The trial thereof resulted in an order made suspending him from practicing his profession. On appeal therefrom the judgment was reversed

(Matter of Kling,

44 Cal. App. 267, [186 Pac. 152]) upon the ground that the same .was not warranted by the evidence. Upon the going down of the

remittitur,

appellant served and filed his bill for costs and disbursements made at the trial and on appeal, to which respondent interposed a motion to retax, strike out and disallow the same, which motion was by the court grante4 and from which this appeal is prosecuted.

Appellant, conceding that the allowance of costs is a matter of statutory regulation, bases his claim to the allowance thereof upon the statutes applicable to sivil cases and special proceedings to the effect that the prevailing party, except in certain cases wherein this proceeding is,not included, is entitled to costs both for expenditures made in the lower court upon trial and upon appeal. (See secs. 1022, 1024, 1025, 1027, Code - Civ. Proe.) These sections appear to refer alone to the allowance of costs in civil actions and special proceedings; hence we have grave doubts as to whether they constitute authority for an allowance of costs to one who successfully defends himself in a disbarment proceeding, the provisions for which are confined to chapter 1, title V, part I, Code of Civil Procedure, entitled, “Attorneys and Counselors at Law,” wherein no reference is made to an allowance of costs in such a proceeding. (See

Morton

v.

Watson,

60 Neb. 672, [84 N. W. 91];

State

v.

Fisher,

82 Neb. 361, [117 N. W. 882];

In re Watt & Dohan,

154 Fed. 678; and

In re Eaton,

7 N. D. 269, [74 N. W. 870].)

Since, however, we are clearly of the opinion that the appeal must be dismissed, we deem it unnecessary to decide the question.