Marin Union Junior College District v. Gwinn

NOURSE, P. J.

Petitioner sued in

mandamus

to require the respondent to approve a claim for the cost of educating

[13]

students in the Marin Union Junior College District who were residents of .the city and county of San Francisco. Respondent’s demurrer to the petition was sustained without leave to amend and petitioner appeals on the judgment-roll.

The Junior College District is organized under the act of May 27, 1921 (Stats. 1921, p. 756). During the fiscal year 1927-28 it expended for capital outlays, including the purchase of lands and the erection- of buildings, the sum of $48,-448.18. The total cost of maintaining the school during that year was $105,456.21. The aid received from the state under the act amounted to $18,800. The petitioner subtracted this amount from its total expenditures and, on the basis of an average daily attendance of 168 students, estimated the average cost per student as $515.81. During the year 16 students whose residence was in the city and county of San Francisco attended the college and, upon the estimate above mentioned, the petitioner presented its claim to respondent in the sum of $8,252.96. The single question involved is whether under the act the city and county is required to pay an equal proportion of the cost of capital outlays made by the district.

Section 15 of the act of 1921 called for a special tax' in the county of the student’s residence “to pay the cost of educating such students” in a junior college district located in another county. The funds so raised were to be “in proportion to the total net cost ... of educating” such students. The same section provided that such funds' “shall be used to

maintain

the junior college.” By the act of May 28, 1927 (Stats. 1927, p. 1278), this section was amended by striking out the word “net,” so that the law provided, at the time this controversy arose, that the outside county should pay “in proportion to the total cost ... of educating” a sum to be used for maintenance purposes. Counsel for both parties concede that the amendment of 1927 has no bearing upon the question involved which is reduced to a simple interpretation of the meaning of the expression “cost of educating” and maintenance of the school.