Jensen v. Duke
Before: Cabaniss
CABANISS, P. J.,
pro tem.
This appeal, based upon the judgment-roll, is from a decree ordering foreclosure of a mortgage held by plaintiff and later herein to be more particularly mentioned.
The facts, informally stated, are these: Plaintiff executed to A. F. Abbott and F. E. Winnegar a trust deed to a cer
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tain lot of land as security for $3,750 borrowed by plaintiff from Frank B. Abbott. In August, 1918, plaintiff sold the land to defendant Margaret Duke subject to the trust deed, she giving her note for the purchase price ($1,550), and a mortgage to secure its payment—this being the mortgage plaintiff seeks to foreclose. Plaintiff’s debt to Frank B. Abbott not having been paid, on January 3, 1920, the property was validly sold at trustee’s sale to him (said Frank B. Abbott) ; and on January 19,1920, defendant Margaret Duke purchased the property from Frank B. Abbott. On April 30, 1920, defendants Margaret and George E. Duke sold and deeded the land to defendants J. W. and J. D. de Lange, who, on the fourth day of June, 1921, executed to the defendant Oakland Title Insurance and Guaranty Company as trustee a deed to secure payment of $3,250 loaned the de Langes by defendant Equitable Life Insurance Company. All the instruments executed in these various transactions were seasonably recorded.
The sole question is: Was the mortgage lien (admittedly extinguished by the trustee’s deed to Abbott) revivified by his deed to defendant Margaret Duke (mortgagor), thereby restoring the mortgage as a lien enforceable against her and those deriving title or other interest from her.
There is an absolute dearth of authority in California upon the precise question here to be determined, and yet we feel persuaded that plaintiff’s (respondent’s) position finds support in section 2930 of the Civil Code, which reads: “Title acquired by the mortgagor subsequent to the execution of the mortgage, inures to the mortgagee as security for the debt in like manner as if acquired before the execution. ”
Though defendant Margaret Duke lost title by reason of the trust sale to Abbott, she again acquired title under Abbott’s deed to her, and the title, thus acquired, inures “to the mortgagee as security for the debt in like manner as if acquired before the execution,” i. e., of the mortgage. It will be noted that instant ease is brought literally within the words of the quoted section.
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