Hollingsworth v. Lewis
Before: Sturtevant
STURTEVANT, J.
The plaintiff commenced an action to recover compensation for services as an attorney at law rendered in behalf of the defendants before the Interstate Commerce Commission. The defendants appeared and an
[527]
swered. The plaintiff interposed a demurrer to the answer; it was sustained, and the defendants were given permission to amend within 10 days. They did not amend, and thereafter a judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff for $5,963.40, with interest thereon from the date of the filing of the complaint, and for costs. From that judgment the defendants have appealed and have brought up the judgment-roll.
In his complaint the plaintiff set forth his cause of action in four separate counts. In the fourth count he pleaded a written contract
in Imeo verba.
That portion of the contract material to a determination of the questions presented to us is as follows: “It is further agreed by and between the parties hereto that in the event that aforementioned reductions are secured, the said party of the second part shall turn over to the said party of the first part freight bills covering shipments made prior to the date on which such reductions became effective and on which freight charges shall have been paid by the said party of the second part, for the purpose of enabling the said party of the first part to secure refunds on such shipments to whatever basis shall be found just and reasonable by the Interstate Commerce Commission, and fifty per cent (50%) of the refunds so secured shall accrue to the said party of the first part, and the remaining fifty per cent (50%) shall accrue to the said party of the second part.” In their answer, by certain admissions, allegations and denials, the defendants pleaded that of the moneys paid to them by order of the Interstate Commerce Commission $4,945.08 is principal—that is, moneys theretofore illegally collected from the
defendants;
and that the difference between the sum last stated and the amount claimed by the plaintiff represents a part of the moneys ordered paid to defendants as interest. In other words, it was the contention of the defendants in the lower court, and it is their sole point on appeal, that the plaintiff under the terms of his contract was not entitled to share in the moneys received by the defendants as interest on the principal sums illegally collected from the defendants by certain transportation companies. If this contention is a correct interpretation of the contract the judgment as rendered should be modified.
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