In Re Sing

Juvenile Court Law—Misdemeanor—Habeas Corpus.—Under section 26 of the juvenile court law, which provides: “In all eases where any child shall be dependent or delinquent under the terms of this act, the parent or parents, legal guardian or person having the custody of the child, or any other person who shall by any act or omission encourage, cause or contribute to the dependency or delinquency of such child, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor,” etc., “any other person,” not having the custody of such child, may be convicted of a misdemeanor under its terms, and after such conviction cannot be discharged on habeas corpus on the ground that he did not stand in loco parentis to such child.

Id.—Statutory Construction—Legislative Scheme—Particular Pro. visions.—In the construction of statutes for the purpose of ascertaining the legislative intent, regard is to be had not so much to the exact phraseology in which that intent has been expressed as to the general scope and intent of the entire legislative scheme embodied in the statute. All of its provisions must be considered together and must be reconciled as far as possible, and particular provisions must be so construed as not to defeat the general purpose and policy of the law.

Id.—Scheme and Purpose oe Juvenile Court Law.—It is apparent from a reading of the entire juvenile court law that the legislature intended to provide protection for all children, who, by the terms' of the act, were either dependent or delinquent, by attaching a penalty to any act contributing to such dependency or delinquency, whether they belong to a class who have parents, guardians or custodians, or to a class with neither.

Id.—Punishment Under Law.—Anyone who contributes to the dependency of a child, whatever may be his relation thereto, becomes amenable to punishment under the provisions of section 26 of the juvenile court law.

Id.—Doctrine of Ejusdem Generis—In Loco Parentis—Intention of Legislature Controlling.—The doctrine of ejusdem generis invoked for the construction of the juvenile court law as applicable only to persons standing in loco parentis is but a rule of construction to aid in determining the meaning of the legislature not otherwise apparent, but does not warrant the legislature in confining its operation within narrower limits than was intended by the lawmakers. To hold that the legislature intended only to protect dependents against persons standing in loco parentis would be to hold that dependents with whom no one stood in such relation should be unprotected; while to give the words “any other person” a broader signification would make the act applicable to the protection of all dependents.